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THE CASE FOR CONSUMER-ORIENTED 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND DISCLOSURE 
Shlomit Azgad-Tromer* 
It is legally impossible to offer securities to the public without giving 
thorough and exhaustive disclosures, allowing potential buyers to compare 
such securities with competing investment options.  But it is legally 
possible to offer the public any other product under the wide wings of the 
freedom of commercial speech. 
This article calls for corporate informational accountability towards 
consumers by setting affirmative disclosure standards and requirements on 
corporations that offer products or services to the public.  The article 
compares product choice to investment allocation, arguing that the choice 
process, product complexity, and risks are often higher for consumers than 
for investors.  This article also compares the consumer product market to 
the capital markets, showing that, while investors are aided in their analysis 
of information by investment advisors and other intermediaries, consumers 
typically undertake their product research and make their choices unaided.  
Thus, despite the abundance of commercial speech, markets fail to provide 
consumers with the requisite information to make an efficient choice, and 
they overwhelm consumers with an overload of information. 
Therefore, this article argues that the informational rights of 
consumers should be as well protected as the informational rights of 
investors. Corporate law is established as the doctrinal setting for product 
disclosures, offering an extension of the scope of current corporate 
governance by applying stakeholder theory to consumers as corporate 
members.  Finally, corporate law accountability standards are shown to be 
superior to the current contractarian view towards accountability for 
product information.  Three essential standards for corporate disclosure 
accountability towards consumers are suggested, including a duty of 
 
*  This Article is based on a doctoral dissertation written at Tel Aviv University–Buchman 
Faculty of Law, and on research performed at Harvard Law School as a Visiting Researcher. 
The author is grateful to Professors Menny Mautner, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Oren Bar-Gill and 
Orly Lobel for their advice.  
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materiality, accessibility, and concise disclosures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When offering securities to the United States public, corporations 
must comply with an exclusive informational regime that allows speech 
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only within the uniform boundaries determined by the Securities & 
Exchange Commission.
1
 Corporations must use a standardized method for 
financial audits and reports, and disclose in plain and simple English any 
material fact of interest to a potential buyer.
2
  But when offering the public 
other products, corporations are entitled to speak freely to consumers as 
they wish, under the wide wings of the freedom of commercial speech, 
constrained only by the ban on misrepresentation and fraud.
3
  Why are 
 
 1.  The Securities Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982), regulates the 
public offering and sale of securities in interstate commerce and requires a prospectus 
designed to provide all material information necessary to investors to fully assess the merits 
and risks of the purchased security.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 1934 Act”), 
15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982), requires all registrants to file periodic reports with the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in electronic format through the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system.  See also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF WALL STREET 73-100 (3d ed. 2003) (observing the events and hearings that shaped the 
development of the early securities acts and markets following the depression); William O. 
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE L. REV. 521, 522 (1934) (criticizing the 
Securities Act for, among other things, assuming that the public’s intake of information will 
give investors needed protection). 
 2.  Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, Exchange Act Release 
No. 39,593, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,011, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (Feb. 6, 
1998).  The SEC has legal authority to establish financial accounting and reporting 
standards for publicly held companies under the 1934 Act. 
 3.  The Supreme Court demonstrates an eclectic approach to the protection of 
commercial speech, subjecting regulation interfering with free advertising to various 
degrees of constitutional scrutiny.  The Supreme Court has upheld such regulation, but has 
also struck such regulation down based on First Amendment protection.  See, e.g., Rubin v. 
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1994) (holding unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, which prohibited beer labels from 
displaying alcohol content); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 
430-31 (1993) (striking down a ban on the placement of commercial newsracks on city 
streets and holding that the City had not met its burden of establishing a reasonable fit 
between its legitimate interests in aesthetics of streets and the means it chose to serve these 
interests); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774 (1993)(holding unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment the Florida Board of Accountancy’s rule that prohibited accountants from 
engaging in direct, in-person, uninvited solicitations).  The resulting policy differentiates the 
constitutional protection of commercial speech into two subcategories.  The first regards 
regulation of false or misleading commercial speech, and the second regards regulation of 
commercial speech in all other cases. The purpose of freedom of commercial speech is to 
protect the dissemination of truthful commercial information, in an effort to ensure that the 
public is “intelligent and well informed.”  Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). The Supreme Court does not typically 
extend constitutional protection to restrictions of commercial speech designed to achieve 
ends other than the dissemination of truthful information.  See, e.g., 44 Liquormart Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (striking down a Rhode Island law that banned 
advertisement of alcohol prices in an effort to reduce demand for alcohol).  While the First 
Amendment is now considered to protect the dissemination of truthful and non-misleading 
commercial communications about lawful products and services, the State is authorized to 
regulate potentially deceptive or overreaching advertising more freely than other forms of 
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investors better protected than consumers?  Why does our legal system 
choose to provide consumers of investments better information to secure 
their freedom of choice? 
The answers lie in the limited scope of current corporate law.  
Consumers are not considered corporate stakeholders entitled to 
informational accountability.  Rather, consumers are a weak and voiceless 
party to a contractual relationship with the corporate seller.  The consumer 
capacity is therefore restricted by the terms of the contract, which is 
determined unilaterally by the seller.  In 2014, corporations offering 
merchandise or services to the public enjoy the status of small merchants in 
the archaic marketplace.  They need to provide consumers with information 
only to the extent necessary to render the agreement voluntary, as required 
under contract law.  Consumers of securities, on the other hand, are labeled 
"investors" and are considered prominent corporate stakeholders.  Offering 
securities to the public invokes an informational regime that requires 
periodic and immediate uniform disclosures, including all material 
information in plain English, accompanied by standardized financial audits 
and reports.
4
 
Current corporate law does not acknowledge consumers as legitimate 
corporate stakeholders and does not impose any duty towards consumers.  
Corporate accountability is reserved to the shareholders or to the 
corporation itself as a whole.
5
  Board members are agents appointed by 
 
speech.  The resulting constitutional scrutiny standard regarding regulation of such speech is 
minimal, “less than strict” review.  Id. at 489 (adopting the “less than strict” standard of 
review for commercial speech).  See generally Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 
618, 634-35 (1995) (upholding a state bar rule making lawyers wait thirty days before 
soliciting legal business from accident victims or their families by direct mail); United 
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1993) (upholding against a First 
Amendment challenge a federal statute prohibiting a radio station licensed in North 
Carolina, a non-lottery state, from broadcasting advertisements to another state’s lottery); 
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-56 
(1986) (upholding a ban on the advertisement of casino gambling to residents of Puerto 
Rico, reasoning that the power to regulate such commercial speech was a derivative of the 
greater power to ban gambling); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (holding a 
statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the 
prices of prescription drugs as unconstitutional, based on First Amendment protection); 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-26 (1975) (holding it an error to assume that 
commercial speech is not entitled to First Amendment Protection or that it lacks value in the 
marketplace of ideas).  See also John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 
1293, 1300 (1993) (noting how First Amendment law has evolved into an elaborate 
construction of specific judicial decisions). Previously, fraudulent or misleading commercial 
speech was altogether unprotected by the First Amendment, and therefore its regulation was 
not subject to constitutional review.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes 
and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 146 (1996).  
 4.  See supra notes 1-2. 
 5.  See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“Corporate officers and 
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shareholders, and their corporate involvement is focused, and often limited, 
to the corporation's financial performance.
6
  Board members of the 
corporation typically do not receive information about product disclosures 
and are not considered to be in charge of the corporation's relationship with 
its consumers.  Indeed, a corporation’s board members, who are personally 
accountable for financial reports under several regimes, often approve 
disclosures to investors under the federal securities laws.
7
  However, direct 
accountability neither applies to consumers nor accompanies product 
disclosures. 
Regulation favors investors over consumers.  For investors, the SEC 
provides information management services and has established uniform 
legible standards for disclosure, which are accessible through a Web-based 
platform for comparing alternative corporate investments.
8
  No such 
regulatory service is available for consumer products.  Investors' rights to 
information are provided ex ante to the moment of purchase, whereas 
consumers' rights to information are generally left to court rulings from 
cases of misrepresentation, ex post to the transaction date. 
What distinguishes consumers from investors?  Mainly, the purpose of 
the purchase: consumers shopping for higher returns on their investments 
are legally protected and secured, whereas consumers shopping for other 
products or services are left to bargain for information under their contracts 
of purchase.  Indeed, a buyer's status as an investor or as a consumer forms 
 
directors . . .[,] [w]hile technically not trustees . . . stand in a fiduciary relation to the 
corporation and its stockholders.”); see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 
(Mich. 1919) (noting that directors are employed and a corporation is organized primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders).  
 6.  The following information is typically provided to the directors of publicly held 
companies: monthly, quarterly, and annual financial statements; cash flow, capital and 
operating budgets; materials on business and financial aspects of major proposed actions 
such as mergers, sales of securities, or investment in new plants; salary and pension 
information, in general terms; information on major litigation by or against the corporation; 
information on labor negotiations; copies of important documents filed with government 
agencies, and important press releases; an agenda for the Board meeting, with minutes of the 
past meeting; analyses of the company done by outside sources, and information about the 
industry; perhaps, manufacturing or marketing data; and tax information. ).  Session Four: 
The Board of Directors’ Access to and Use of Information, 6 J. COMP. BUS. & CAPITAL 
MARKET L. 243, 252 n.9 (1984)  Directors of privately held companies would receive the 
same sort of information, especially the information in categories (a)-(c). Id. 
 7.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) (requiring responsibility for corporate 
actions in a variety of circumstances, including financial reports). 
 8.  See Filings & Forms, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Sept. 14, 2014) (providing that all companies, 
foreign and domestic, are required to file registration statements, periodic reports, and other 
forms electronically through EDGAR). 
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a clear dichotomy of informational rights.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
considered requests for product information based on buyers’ motivation,
9
 
but has denied informational rights to consumers who were not categorized 
as investors and who lacked investment motivation in their purchase.  
Consumption motivation is our system's justification for denying product 
information to consumers of real life essentials and for eliminating their 
freedom of choice.
10
 
 
 9.  A few cases demonstrate the significance corporate law attaches to investors rather 
than consumers.  In Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., the respondent 
offered units of citrus grove development coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing 
and remitting net proceeds to the investor. 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946).  Each customer was 
offered both a land sales contract and a service contract, after being told that it was not 
feasible to invest in the grove unless a service contract is made.  Id. at 295.  The land sale 
contract provided a uniform contract price per acre or fraction thereof, varying in amount 
only with the number of years the plot had been planted with citrus trees.  Id.  The service 
contract gave possession over the land to an affiliated party of the seller, where the company 
was accountable only for an allocation of the net profits based on a check made at the time 
of picking.  Id. at 296.  The purchasers were, for the most part, non-residents of Florida, 
predominantly business people who lacked the knowledge and equipment to cultivate citrus 
groves.  Id.  The Securities Exchange Commission claimed that the transaction constituted 
an “investment contract” subject to the Securities Act in order to base disclosure 
requirements on the seller.  Id. at 297-98.  If the transaction was not labeled an investment 
contract, no disclosure requirement was necessary.  Id.  Likewise, in United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, a housing cooperative in New York City offered apartments 
through shares of stock that were explicitly tied to the apartment. 421 U.S. 837, 842 (1975).  
The respondents claimed the Information Bulletin that accompanied the transaction failed to 
disclose several critical facts.  Id. at 844.  One test applied by the Court of Appeals was the 
expectation for profits: to be considered for enhanced disclosure requirements, the purchase 
should be motivated by the prospect of returns on investment rather than the use or 
consumption of the item purchased.  Id. at 851-53.  The Supreme Court concluded that the 
investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live and not by the 
financial returns of their investment, and hence could not benefit from securities disclosure 
requirements.  Id. at 853.  Finally, in Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court rejected 
the Howey approach to determining whether an instrument is “an investment contract,” only 
to adopt the “family resemblance” test of a security, applying the same motivation 
examination, where courts are required “to assess the motivations that would prompt a 
reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it.”  494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990).  The Court stated: 
If the seller’s purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business 
enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested 
primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is likely to 
be a “security.”  If the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a 
minor asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller’s cash-flow difficulties or 
to advance some other commercial or consumer purpose, on the other hand, the 
note is less sensibly described as a “security.  
Id. at 66.  Howey, Forman, and Reves demonstrate an unbearable result from the perspective 
of this Article.  There is no sound justification for excluding consumers from disclosure 
rights based on their consumption motivations.  The court is working under the assumption 
that only investors should be entitled to information accountability standards.  
 10.  See W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 300 (explaining that securities laws apply when 
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Legal literature widely views a corporation as a hierarchy of 
shareholders, board members, and management, where each layer is 
serving as an appointed agent of the former layer.
11
  Shareholders appoint 
the members of the board, who in turn appoint a management team to 
manage the shareholders’ assets held by the corporation.
12
  Most corporate 
law scholarship discusses mechanisms to reduce the agency costs 
accompanying this corporate structure, aiming to increase shareholder 
value stemming from the corporation:  the ultimate purpose of corporate 
law.
13
  A large body of literature focuses on corporate disclosure duties 
typically imposed in order to enhance shareholder participation and 
empowerment in the otherwise agent-based management.
14
  Most of this 
 
investors “are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their investment” and that the 
laws do not apply when purchasers are motivated “to occupy the land or to develop it 
themselves”); see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 64, aff’d, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 
(1993); Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled by Reves v. 
Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (using an approach focusing on investment-like 
properties, certain promissory notes were classified as securities); Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. 
v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that certain notes 
can be classified as securities within the federal securities laws, relying in part on the 
commercial-investment dichotomy used in classification).  
 11.  Viewing the shareholder franchise as a key mechanism for keeping boards 
accountable is an essential and well-established mechanism of corporate law, documented in 
the literature as well as in court opinions.  See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 
651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (discussing the “central importance of the [shareholder] franchise 
to the scheme of corporate governance”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected 
representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board 
out.”).  For a leading analysis of the faults of this apparent corporate democracy, see Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007).  For a 
leading discussion of management-board relationships as principal-agent, see Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 
(2010).  
 12.  Shareholders who are displeased with their board can nominate director candidates 
and then solicit proxies for them.  See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 105 (1986) (outlining 
statutory authority for shareholder removal of corporate directors); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The 
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev., 833, 837 (2005) (“In theory, 
incumbents who fail to initiate a change that shareholders view as value-increasing will be 
ousted in a proxy contest by a team promising to make the value-enhancing change.”). 
 13.  Lucian A. Bebchuk, Making Directors Accountable, HARVARD MAG., Nov.-Dec. 
2003, at 29. 
 14.  See e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373-80 (1998) (providing a historic perspective 
and rationale for the disclosure requirement); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in 
International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387, 401-07 (2001) (stating that 
disclosure duties provide protection for investors and discussing the need to establish clear 
rules for international securities transactions); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a 
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2533-50 (1997) 
(illustrating the benefits from greater disclosure, including fairness for the investors, 
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literature focuses on the mandatory nature of disclosure duties towards 
investors and their underlying justification.
15
 
The call for including consumers as corporate stakeholders and for 
imposing corporate informational accountability towards consumers rests 
on the observation that investors are not the only group that may provide 
value to corporate production and thus are not the only group to whom the 
corporation owes value.
16
  Rather than viewing the corporation as property 
of its shareholders, stakeholder theory views the corporation as a set of 
relationships between customers, suppliers, employees, financiers 
(stockholders, bondholders, banks, etc.), and communities.
17
  Under the 
stakeholder approach, the role of the board of directors is to manage and 
shape those relationships and allocate resources and liabilities among 
different stakeholder groups.
18
  Blair and Stout suggest a “team production” 
theory of corporate law, wherein corporations are legal entities forming a 
platform for sharing rights in a joint product created based on the input of 
all team members:  financiers, investors, employees, suppliers, customers 
and others.
19
  Accordingly, the board of directors becomes a “mediating 
hierarchy,” and board members become coordinators of team members’ 
 
investment risk reduction, and efficient allocation of resources).  Cf. Marcel Kahan, 
Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1034-
35 (1992) (discussing macroeconomic impact of sudden market corrections after previously 
undisclosed information goes public); Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in 
Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81 (2007) 
(advocating mandatory, rather than market-based disclosure requirements). 
 15.  See generally JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 250 (2009) (citing James D. Cox, 
Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1230-1232 (1999) 
(discussing alternative viewpoints on which regulatory bodies are best equipped to set and 
enforce mandatory disclosure requirements)). 
 16.  See, e.g., R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE 
ART 5-6 (2010) (suggesting relationships between a business and groups affecting or 
affected by it as unit of analysis); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW 
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 38 
(2012) (stating that stakeholders contract with, rather than own, corporations and 
“corporations own themselves”); Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder 
Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
65, 68 (1999) (“Stakeholder analysts argue that all persons or groups with legitimate 
interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and that there is no prima 
facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another.”) (emphasis in original); R. 
EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984) 
(defining stakeholder as one who can “affect or is affected by” an organization). 
 17.  See STOUT, supra note 16, at 37-38 (stating that shareholders—like debtholders, 
employees, and suppliers—contracts with corporations). 
 18.  FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 16.  
 19.  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250-51 (1999).  
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activities and allocators of the resulting production value between different 
members.
20
 
Recent trends in corporate disclosures reflect an increase in 
corporations' willingness to consider a wider circle of stakeholders.  
Sustainability reporting, which gives investors information about the non-
financial performance of the corporation in different constituencies, is now 
widely applied and incorporated into corporate filings,
21
 and some nations 
require inclusion of its principles.
22
  All but one company listed in the S&P 
500 has voluntarily made a sustainability disclosure in a financial filing or 
linked financial performance to a sustainability initiative.
23
  As of 2013, 
U.K. regulations require that publicly traded, large corporations file 
“strategic reports,” which must include corporate performance indicators, 
which effectively measure the company's business position and its 
performance.
24
  In India, a 2013 law requires large companies to invest in 
sustainability initiatives and engage in corporate social responsibility 
activities with two percent of their average net profits.
25
  
This article argues for the inclusion of consumers as corporate 
stakeholders and for corporate accountability for product information.  The 
argument is structured as follows.  Part I compares consumers to investors, 
showing that consumers are more vulnerable in their relationships with 
corporate sellers than investors are and thus need greater informational 
accountability.  This article compares the scope of risks per purchase (or 
investment), the complexity of product choice versus investment allocation, 
and the right to exit, showing that consumers are at least as vulnerable as 
investors.  The consumer products market is compared to capital markets, 
and in particular, the role of institutional and investment advisors acting in 
 
 20.  Id. at 250.  
 21.  PETER DESIMONE, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. INST., INTEGRATED 
FINANCIAL AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1-4 (2013), available at 
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL_Integrated_Financial_Sustain_Reporting_April_2013.pdf; 
STEVE LYDENBERG, JEAN ROGERS & DAVID WOOD, THE HAUSER CENTER FOR NONPROFIT 
ORG., FROM TRANSPARENCY TO PERFORMANCE: INDUSTRY-BASED SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORTING ON KEY ISSUES 2 (2010), available at http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/IRI_Combined_KPI.pdf. 
     22.    See supra text accompanying notes 282-286 
 23.  DESIMONE, supra note 21, at 5.  
 24.  The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 
2013, 2013, S.I. 1970 (U.K.).  These reports on the company’s corporate standing include 
“information about (i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s 
business on the environment) (ii) the company’s employees, and (iii) social community and 
human rights issues . . . .”  Id. at § 414C(7)(b)(i)-(iii).. 
 25.  Section 135 of the new Act requires that the Board of Directors makes sure that at 
least two percent of the company’s average net profits during the three preceding years is 
spent on corporate social responsibility policy.  For the full version of the law, see The 
Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013). 
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the investment market is compared to consumer unions acting with the aim 
of reducing information gathering costs in the consumer products market.  
Comparing the structural characteristics of the consumer products market 
to the capital markets leads to the same conclusion: consumers' 
informational rights are under protected. 
Part II analyzes the voluntary commercial speech environments for the 
consumer products market.  The analysis portrays informational practices 
from three distinct sources:  sellers, consumers, and third parties—in 
particular, consumer organizations.  This second part of the article explains 
why voluntary disclosures are insufficient to create a solid foundation for 
freedom of consumer choice, due to both market failures in consumers' 
demand for information and to market failures in the supply of product 
information.  Consumers have both too much and too little information:  
commercial speech overwhelms informational environments, but, given 
masses of information overload, it often becomes very costly to find factual 
information about the material features of the product.  At the same time, 
often the most important and material information is completely 
unavailable due to insufficient incentives for all three information sources, 
the inaccessibility of adequate sources of information, and suboptimal 
mediums for its dissemination.  Consider, the following examples:  the 
effective costs of car ownership, the chemical composition and quality of 
bottled water, and the real savings value compared to future costs of living 
for pension plans.  Consumers' bounded rationality, along with their 
cognitive limitations, makes them vulnerable to the overloaded commercial 
speech environment, and given limitations in consumers' capacity to absorb 
and analyze the overload of information in the consumer products market, 
leads to failure in the efficient allocation of demand for product 
information.  Sustainability reporting gives little answer to the problem of 
product information as it is not product specific and not directed at 
consumers.  Market failure is evident on both the demand and supply side 
of the product information market. 
Part III argues for consumers' corporate membership using 
organizational theories of the corporation.  Given that consumer contracts 
are frequently non-negotiable,
26
 but rather subject consumers to the rules 
determined unilaterally by the seller, the relationship of consumers with 
 
 26.  Contract obligations are voluntarily assumed: a contract is a legal vehicle for 
enforcement of mutual assent. In the sale of products or services to the public, one side 
defines the terms and elements of agreement, and the consumer may merely opt-in or out of 
the agreement by her decision of purchase. See JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT 
HARVEY & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 511, 420-21 (8th 
ed. 2003) (discussing the prevalence of standard form contracts in modern business and 
observing that parties do not negotiate the details of every transaction). 
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corporate sellers resembles organizational membership.  Securities 
Exchange Commission v. H. J. Howey Co.
27
 and United Housing 
Foundation Inc. v. Forman
28
 create a legal distortion because it is not the 
purpose of purchase we need to protect, but rather the unilateral 
relationship and one-sided control of all relevant information, which 
equally apply to consumers and investors alike. 
Part IV compares the doctrinal foundations of corporate law to those 
currently available to consumers under contract law, showing the merits of 
the former in setting a disclosure regime for the consumer sector.  While 
theoretical foundations for corporate inclusion of stakeholders are well 
established, corporate law literature does not offer any model for corporate 
accountability towards consumers.  Part IV suggests three essentials for 
product information corporate policy.  Product information should be 
required to include all material features and aspects of product ownership 
and be accessible and concise from a reasonable consumer's point of view. 
Disclosures should be accessible, easy to understand and read, and be 
placed prominently on the front of the package.  The article suggests 
standards for product transparency requirements and establishes corporate 
law as the doctrinal setting for product disclosures, offering an extension of 
the scope of current corporate governance. 
I. COMPARING CONSUMERS TO INVESTORS 
Free choice serves as a basic and prominent foundation of capitalistic 
social ideology and of the respective legal thought regarding the 
commercial arena.  Choice encompasses the moral basis for contracts and 
their enforcement and is widely considered both a value to be strived for 
and a basis for responsibility allocation of the agents possessing it.  Our 
legal system goes a long way to protect that meaningful choice process for 
investors, creating a federal agency that sets exclusive disclosure standards 
for securities,
29
 whereas consumers seem to conduct many of their choices 
in informational darkness, significantly limiting their ability to exercise 
informed and rational decision-making.
30
  In this part of the article, 
consumers are compared to investors using several analytic measures.  An 
 
 27.  328 U.S. 293 (1946).  
 28.  421 U.S. 837 (1975). 
 29.  See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 30.  Informational darkness may be caused by insufficient product information or by an 
overloaded information environment placing the costs of research on the consumer.  In 
general, freedom of commercial speech applies to all speech regarding products, with the 
exception of food and drugs. See Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free 
Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 140-43 (2011) (discussing 
FDA regulations on speech). 
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analysis of the characteristics of the two groups and their applicable 
markets shows that consumers should be protected at least as much as 
investors and may in fact require a higher degree of protection than that 
given to investors regarding informational rights. 
A. Consumer Choice Process vs. Investments Allocation Process 
Consumers' product choice process is prone to mistakes and 
confusion.  While an investor’s typical investment allocation is done in a 
rational, planned process that uses advisors or mediating institutions, 
typical consumer choice is spontaneous, irrational and highly affected by 
personal emotions and cognitive limitations.  Corporate sellers strategically 
avoid information-based marketing and instead strengthen the emotional 
aspect of consumer decision making because they lack incentives to share 
product information with the public.
31
  Bundling strategies promote the 
consumers’ misperception of products and services, subjecting rational 
information-based decision making to potential misperceptions.
32
  Vague 
and manipulative presentations place a significant burden on consumers 
trying to compare and understand the implications of products.
33
  Even if 
 
 31.  For a sociological analysis of subjective emotional promotions in consumer 
markets, see JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES 88-89 
(C.T. trans., Sage Publications 1998) (1970); MARTY NEUMEIER, THE BRAND GAP: HOW TO 
BRIDGE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN BUSINESS STRATEGY AND DESIGN 38-39 (2003).  Sellers do 
have an incentive to treat their clients fairly because repeat buyers consider the reputation of 
a seller as shown in Lucian A. Bebchuck & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in 
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827-28 (2006).  However, in a 
competitive context, information sharing and investment in assistance to consumers in 
evaluating products’ characteristics may prove inefficient and costly for sellers.  See, e.g., 
Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
Information, 44 J.L. & ECON 491, 503 (1981) (discussing the costs of consumer protection 
regulation).  Consumers’ ignorance benefits sellers on average also due to the sub-optimal 
use of products by ignorant consumers. 
 32.  See Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 
33-34 (2006) (taking consumer misperception as a given and discussing how sellers employ 
the bundling strategy in the face of that misperception); Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting 
and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199, 208-09 (1985) (discussing bundling in the 
context of segregate gains); Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: 
The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661 (1982) (examining bundling through 
the lens of tying requirements). 
 33.  This is due to both cognitive and emotional constraints.  For a general survey of 
cognitive constraints, see Angelo DeNisi & Raed Elaydi, Which Came First, The Irrational 
Consumer or the Irrational Corporation?, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 33, 35 (2000) 
(discussing information constraints placed on consumers by organizations); Christine Jolls, 
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-77 (1998) (discussing three limitations of human behavior:  
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest, that cause humans to 
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sellers provided complete information regarding product characteristics, 
consumers would be unable to analyze and process the mass of information 
available to them due to information overload
34
 and low literacy levels with 
respect to corporate documents.
35
 
B. Scope of Risks 
Typically, investors risk only the capital located in their investment 
funds.  Exceptions occur in structured products, derivatives, and shorts, 
which often risk additional funds due to higher leverage.  In all cases, 
investors’ risk is solely monetary.  Consumers, on the other hand, risk 
much more than the purchase cost.  Often, consumer products have health 
implications.  In foods, beverages, toys, clothing, automobiles, cellular 
devices, and many other products, consumers trust sellers with their health 
and potentially their lives.  Potential risks from products can therefore be 
much greater than the purchase cost.
36
  A higher degree of regulation 
applies to product safety and quality control.
37
  However, quality control 
only kicks unacceptable products out of the market, without helping 
consumers choose between remaining acceptable products.
38
 
Corporate law does not govern product safety, thus the board of 
directors is rarely liable for it. Product safety is an engineering staff issue 
and has less to do with senior managers of the corporation, who are 
 
diverge from economic models); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, SCIENCE, Sept. 1974, at 1124 (discussing systematic 
error in commonly-used heuristics, including representativeness, availability of instances or 
scenarios, and adjustment from an anchor) [hereinafter Tverksy & Kahneman, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty].  For a general survey of emotional constraints, see Mary Frances Luce 
et al., Emotional Decisions: Tradeoff Difficulty and Coping in Consumer Choice, 
MONOGRAPHS OF THE J. OF CONSUMER RES., no. 1, 2001 (discussing the role of emotion in 
decision processes).  
 34.  See Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form 
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 167-77 (2007) (discussing the harmful effects of information 
overload on contracting). 
 35.   See generally Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 
13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 234-35 (2002) (reviewing research on consumer literacy and 
readability of consumer contracts and credit agreements).  
 36.  Consider, for example, baby formula and automobile purchases, in which 
consumers trust sellers with their lives.  
 37.  This is not always the case.  See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit 
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (observing that although most products sold in the 
United States pass safety regulations, credit products are relatively less regulated).  
 38.  For example, consider the case of infant car seats. Quality control enforces a 
minimal safety threshold. Consumers still need to make product choice between the 
available products, differing in quality and features, beyond the minimal threshold.  
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typically liable for risks imposed only on investors.
39
   
C. Product Attributes and Complexity of Choice 
Investments are typically judged by comparing expected rate of return 
with imposed risk, so prices can reflect the demand and supply curve and 
signal true value to investors.  Products are more complex, and consumers 
choose products based on a wider spectrum of considerations, features and 
characteristics.  Marketing research shows that, for consumer products, 
“price is but one of several potentially useful extrinsic cues; brand name or 
package may be equally or more important, especially in packaged goods.  
Further, evidence of a generalized price-perceived quality relationship is 
inconclusive.”
40
  Thus, while prices can serve as an ultimate signal of value 
in the investments market, they are less likely to reflect accurately the value 
to consumers.
41
 
D. Intermediaries 
Institutional investors and investment advisors are frequent players in 
the capital markets that have expertise and analytical tools for evaluating 
different investment strategies based on corporate filings.
42
 While 
investment advisers serve the general investing public with investment 
advice,
43
 institutional investors perform most of the transactions in the 
capital markets.
44
 The Securities Act of 1933
45
 and the Securities Exchange 
 
 39.  See generally Francois Brochet and Suraj Srinivasan, Accountability of 
Independent Directors - Evidence From Firms Subject to Securities Litigation (Working 
Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285776 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2285776 (discussing the liability of directors when firms are 
sued for financial and disclosure related fraud). 
 40.  Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A 
Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence, 52 J. MARKETING 2, 17 (1988). 
 41.  See generally Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) (explaining that economic models fail to predict consumer 
behavior because economic models treat consumers as experts even though the average 
consumer is not an expert decision-maker). 
     42.   See Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the 
Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 18-20 (2011) (discussing the role of investment 
advisers). See generally Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public:  Institutional Investors in U.S. 
Capital Markets, 3 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 245 (2009) (discussing the investment 
practices of major institutional investors in the U.S. capital markets). 
     43.    Krug, supra note 42, at 18. 
     44.    See Palmiter, supra note 42, at 245 (noting that institutional investors “collectively 
hold more than three-fourths of U.S. capital market investments.”). 
 45.  The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982) regulates the public offering 
and sale of securities in interstate commerce, requiring a prospectus designed to provide all 
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Act of 1934
46
 were enacted during the peak years of the Great Depression 
with an aim towards protect individual investors.  Nowadays, institutions 
dominate the trading platforms and make most of the U.S. trading 
volume.
47
 
In the consumer product market, consumer unions
48
 take on this role.  
Like analysts and investment advisors, consumer unions exploit economies 
of scale when evaluating and comparing product information.  Unlike 
individual consumers, consumer unions can devote the resources to 
conduct a thorough study of the products available by collecting the 
information, analyzing it, and finally comparing it on a measurable scale.
49
  
The relationship between consumers and their union may be classified as 
an agency relationship; the union is authorized to collect product 
information and test it on behalf of its subscribers.  One prominent example 
is Consumer Reports, which is published by Consumers Union, a nonprofit 
organization established in the 1930s when advertising started flooding the 
media.
50
  For a small fee, consumers in the United States can subscribe to a 
 
material information necessary to investors to fully assess the merits and risks of the 
purchased security. 
 46.  The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982) requires all 
registrants to file periodic reports in electronic format through EDGAR, the Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System. 
 47. Palmiter, supra note 42, at 245.  In the 1950s, retail investors owned over ninety 
percent of the stock of U.S. corporations.  Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail 
Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009).  By 2009, retail investors owned less than 
thirty percent and represented a very small percentage in U.S. trading volume.  Id.; see also 
Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the 
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009) (observing the rapid shift in the last 
thirty years toward the institutionalization in the financial markets in the United States). 
     48.     In using the term “consumers union” in this article, I mean to refer to any platform 
that consumers may look to in order to receive information about products and services. 
Some consumer unions may require subscriptions, such as Consumer Reports. Subscribe, 
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, https://ec.consumerreports.org/ec/cro/order.htm?INTKEY= 
I0AHLT4 (last visited, Dec. 23, 2014). Other consumer unions may be free of charge, such 
as Yelp. YELP, http://www.yelp.com/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2014). 
     49.    See CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, supra note 48 (noting that subscribers get “over a 
thousand ratings, reviews, expert buying advice, product comparisons, consumer user 
reviews, and product video clips to over 5,000 electronics, appliances, home & garden, baby 
gear, and food products . . .”). 
 50.  Occasionally consumers have additional impartial sources of information provided 
by third parties giving independent commercial speech.  See, e.g., Energy Bill Savings Start 
Here!, USWITCH, http://www.uswitch.com/gas-electricity/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) 
(providing for a comparison of gas, electricity, broadband television, mobile phones, and 
insurance); Choose the Right Cell Phone or Plan for You, MYRATEPLAN, 
http://www.myrateplan.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (providing a comparison of a wide 
array of consumer needs, including cell-phone plans, television services, credit cards, travel 
options, and insurance).  Interestingly, these free services stay impartial while being 
frequently sponsored by the reviewed industry.  USwitch UK complies with The Confidence 
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website or magazine that summarizes product information impartially and 
professionally, and presents its findings in a comparable way.
51
  To create 
its professional product studies, Consumers Union employs more than 600 
employees,
52
 who make anonymous purchases, test products in equipped 
laboratories, and publish educational studies for its subscribers.
53
 
Consumers Union aims to provide an impartial, independent source of 
product information that accepts no advertising and runs professional tests 
on products on behalf of potential consumers.
54
  The information output 
from Consumer Reports is impartial, runs ad-free, and is organized and 
presented systematically.
55
  Consumers Union tests products, grades their 
performance under several chosen criteria, compares them to other 
products in the same category, and presents the results in a table format that 
allows for easy comparison and consumer choice.  In a typical report, 
Consumer Reports lists the prices of several alternatives and for each gives 
the overall score and specific grade in each of the tested criteria. 
However, this detailed, analytical report of the alternatives is only 
available for a narrow selection of brands and products.
56
  The impartial 
product review published in Consumer Reports refers to a limited number 
of categories and compares only a few of the available brands for each 
product surveyed.  Other intermediaries acting in the consumer products 
market may be sponsored by the industry reviewed, impairing the 
 
Code, a voluntary practice that requires unbiased comparisons through independence, 
impartiality, the fair presentation of tariffs, and the accuracy of information presented, 
which is managed by the UK energy market regulator Ofgem.  Confidence Code – Code of 
Practice for Online Domestic Price Comparison Services, OFGEM (Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/74615/confidence-code.pdf.  
 51.  Some services, like USwitch U.K., are free of charge, while others, like Consumer 
Reports, charge membership fees.  Compare Energy Bill Savings Start Here!, supra note 50 
(providing product comparisons for free) with Choose Subscription, 
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, https://ec.consumerreports.org/ec/cro/order.htm?INTKEY= 
I0AHLT4 (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (providing comparison services only if the user 
becomes a paid subscriber). 
 52.  Employment is funded by revenue generated by subscriptions.  See Mission, 
CONSUMERSUNION, http://www.consumersunion.org/about/mission/ (last visited Oct. 6, 
2014) (providing information about the Consumers Union staff). 
     53.  Mission, CONSUMERSUNION.ORG, http://consumersunion.org/about/mission/ (last 
visited, Dec. 9, 2014) 
     54.    Id. 
     55.    Id. 
 56.  Most of the products Consumer Union surveys in Consumer Reports are for rather 
large purchases, such as kitchen appliances, automobiles, and expensive baby equipment.  
Consumers Union does not survey any services or low-cost products, perhaps under the 
assumption that services require customization and are thus hard to compare on an ultimate 
social scale, and low-cost items do not stem the drive to research or pay the fee for a 
collective research source.  
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impartiality and commitment to the consumer as their ultimate client.
57
 
Therefore, consumers unions acting in the consumer product 
information market are not a sufficient solution to the problems of product 
information.  Unlike analysts and investment advisors acting in capital 
markets and serving investors, intermediaries acting on behalf of 
consumers fail to solve market failures in the consumer products market 
due to both the costs of information and the structural differences between 
the consumer products and the investment markets. 
The discrepancy of information costs between capital and consumer 
products markets is significant.  Due to the disclosure requirements of the 
federal securities laws, intermediaries acting in capital markets have 
abundant information available under the uniform requirements of 
securities regulation and need only to review and analyze well-digested and 
easily accessible information,
58
 while third parties must bear the costs of 
searching, verifying, analyzing, and occasionally pricing product 
information.
59
 
The cost of obtaining information is significant for the efficient 
functioning of institutions.  Institutions acting in capital markets find 
mandatory disclosure under securities laws useful and think disclosure 
provides users “essential information that heavily influences their 
decisions.”
60
  The information management mechanisms provided by 
EDGAR and its plain English form are generally satisfactory to institutions 
and assist in reducing transaction costs and in facilitating the dissemination 
of clear information to the market.
61
  Institutions are attracted to firms with 
certain disclosure practices, and some corporate managers adopt disclosure 
practices to attract such investors.
62
  A recent empirical study shows that 
 
 57.  See, e.g., WhistleOut Terms of Use, WHISTLEOUT.COM http://www.whistleout. 
com.au/Terms-Of-Use (last visited Dec. 9, 2014) (providing consumer comparisons of 
complex products sponsored through referral commissions of the industries reviewed); 
YELP.COM, http://www.yelp.com/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2014) (relying on enhanced search 
results offered to merchants for sponsorship). 
     58.  See supra note 1 (identifying the primary statutes that regulate the issuance of 
securities in the United States). 
 59.  See How We Test, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/ 
about-us/whats-behind-the-ratings/testing/index.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) 
(documenting the considerable technical, engineering, and scientific costs of Consumer 
Reports). 
 60.  Evans, supra note 47, at 1108 (citing THE SPECIAL COMM. ON FIN. REPORTING, AM. 
INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT., IMPROVING BUSINESS REPORTING – A CUSTOMER FOCUS: 
MEETING THE INFORMATIONAL NEEDS OF INVESTORS & CREDITORS (1994), available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/frc/accountingfinancialreporting/downloadabledocument
s/jenkins%20committee%20report.pdf).  
 61.  Id. at 1112. 
 62.  See Brian J. Bushee & Christopher F. Noe, Corporate Disclosure Practices, 
Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 171, 200 (2000) 
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even index funds, which are passive and cost-conscious investors, govern 
through eliciting disclosure.
63
 Indeed, institutional investors appreciate 
disclosures:  they have the capacity to analyze and understand the disclosed 
texts and the ability to elicit information.
64
  A recent work comparing the 
bond and the loan markets in the U.S. shows that even in the absence of 
mandatory disclosure, institutional investors obtain significant information 
about their investments in syndicated loans through private ordering.
65
 
In contrast, for the consumer products market, accumulated 
information of past consumers' experiences is rare.  Consider food and 
beverages as an example – the shared experiences of consumers fail to 
inform us of the ingredients in, and nutritional value of, what we consume.  
However, intermediaries will only bear the costs of research if such 
research efforts would result in profit.  Because sellers are the lower cost 
provider, there is no sense in expecting intermediaries to conduct research 
that would reverse engineer food in order to decipher ingredients and 
nutritional value.  For complex products that often require extensive 
research in order to reveal their nature and characteristics, these costs may 
be significant.  Information aggregators and intermediaries are bound to 
engage in duplicate efforts to reach the same information and uncover it 
only partially.  Mandatory disclosure may lower the cost of information, 
and may thus be justified as a means to improve and enhance the 
competition between information aggregators and intermediaries, as well as 
a means to reduce the entry barriers to the market of information 
aggregation for the benefit of consumers.
66
 
The discrepancy of costs for information traders for investors and for 
consumers is especially questionable when considering the information 
gaps between seller corporations and outside information traders seeking to 
uncover nonpublic information.  This is especially true regarding complex 
products that often require extensive research in order to reveal their nature 
and characteristics.  While regulation lowers the costs of information 
searching for investors, no such information regulation is available for 
 
(“[I]nstitutional investors are attracted to firms with more forthcoming disclosure.”); Mark 
H. Lang and Russell J. Lundholm, Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior, 71 
ACCT. REV. 467, 490 (1996) (“[M]ore forthcoming disclosure policies . . . attract more 
analysts . . . .”). 
 63.  Jordan Schoenfeld, Shareholder Governance Through Disclosure (May 4, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2350181.  
     64.    Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged 
Loan Market, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014) 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  See generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of 
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713-14 (2006) (positing that the role of securities 
regulation is to create and promote a competitive market for information traders). 
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consumers, and third parties acting in the consumer product information 
market are bound to engage in duplicate efforts to reach the same 
information and only partially uncover it.  As the cost of information 
decreases, the number of third party agents and information traders is 
expected to increase,
67
 and their contribution is expected to be more 
precise.
68
 
Corporate accountability for product disclosures can be justified as a 
means to improve and enhance the competition between information 
traders and third party information providers, and as a means to reduce the 
entry barriers to the market of information trading in the consumer products 
market.  The seller corporation is the low-cost provider of relevant 
information.  More corporate accountability for consumer product 
disclosures may lead to fewer instances of asymmetric information between 
consumers and sellers, and contribute to facilitating a competitive market.
69
 
In addition to cost, another reason for the discrepancy between 
institutions in capital markets and intermediaries in the consumer products 
market is the structural characteristics of both markets.  Institutions in 
capital markets enjoy the benefit of a social policy enforcing the public use 
of their services.  Pension funds and provident funds, for example, present 
an extraordinary benefit to their clients, who are inclined to use their 
professional services in order to receive the tax benefits and social 
assurance that accompanies pension savings.
70
  Mutual funds and index 
funds allow the public saving routes that reduce transaction costs for 
trading.
71
  Financial regulation, however, restricts the occupation of money 
management to few certified and highly regulated institutions.
72
  Because 
of this, capital markets are prone to have classes of investors represented by 
 
 67.  See id. at 737 (observing that decreased information search, verification, and 
analysis costs results in an increase in information traders).  
 68.  This argument assumes that mandatory disclosure lowers the effect of noise traders 
and associated noise risk. Id. at 739 (citing Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should 
Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informed Traders?, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 424 (1996)). 
     69.    Id. at 740.  
     70.    See Sharon Reece & Mary Beth Navin, Regulating Pension Fund Investments:  The 
Role of Federal Legislation, 6 B.Y.U. J.  PUB. L. 101, 105 (1992) (noting that the tax 
benefits associated with using pension funds include “exempting pension fund earnings 
from federal income tax, allowing employed contributions to accrue tax-deferred to the 
employee and permitting certain kinds of favorable distribution treatment.”). 
      71. See e.g., Mutual Funds, OHIO DEFERRED COMPENSATION, available at 
https://www.ohio457.org/iApp/tcm/ohio457/guide/basics/mutualfunds/index.jsp (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2014) (noting that mutual funds lower transaction costs “[b]ecause of the size and 
volume of their transactions”). 
      72.  See Barry P. Barbash & Jai Massari, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940:  
Regulation By Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 627 (2008) (identifying the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 as “[t]he centerpiece of U.S. regulation of money managers.”). 
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few certified money managers. 
Consumers, on the other hand, make their decisions unaided.  We 
rarely shop individually for securities, but we always go grocery shopping 
without an intermediary by our side.  So the case for informed consent, 
empowerment, and the need of access to knowledge is stronger for 
consumers than for retail investors.  And at the same time, while the market 
for intermediaries in capital markets prosper thanks to tax incentives and 
financial regulation, incentives for creating a market of intermediaries in 
the consumer products market are meager.  Providing a database of 
mandatory information lowers the costs of entry to the information 
aggregation market and may be required to support its growth.
73
 
E. The Right to Exit 
Corporations give their members and owners three types of rights:  
exit, voice, and loyalty.
74
 Of relevance to this article is the right to exit.  
Indeed, investors in public corporations may exit their investments at 
reasonable costs, by selling their securities on an exchange or over the 
counter and “cashing out” of their relationship with the corporation.  
Consumers of mass products and services may find higher barriers to 
switching their consumption preferences.  Costs of exiting may include 
fees, contractual restrictions, and social and logistical costs that make the 
right to exit theoretical or very costly for the average consumer.
75
  Consider 
the costs of switching a childcare service provider at a preschool, the costs 
of switching a bank account service center, and the costs of switching 
media and cellular providers.  In all three examples, exit is very costly and 
unlikely to serve as a tool of disciplining bad management in striving for its 
reform, even given high and effective competition in the markets.  The 
costs of exit sometimes arise naturally from the situation, as in the 
 
 73.  EDGAR is an interesting benchmark for mandatory disclosure for consumers 
because it succeeds in addressing both the needs of retail investors and the requirements of 
institutions.  Securities disclosures are provided on a single database accessible to all at all 
times, rather than enclosed to each particular securities transaction.  EDGAR provides the 
interested public information easy to compare and to trace back, without burdening or 
imposing on the non-interested public.  Company Filings, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Oct. 
11, 2014). 
 74.  See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 76-77 (1970) (examining a manner of 
analyzing certain economic processes which can illuminate a wide range of social, political, 
and moral phenomena). 
     75.    See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
151, 151 (2014) (discussing restrictions on exit rights and noting that “consumers often 
choose transactions with lock-in provisions, trading off exit rights for other perks.”). 
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childcare example, but are often pre-designed carefully by corporate sellers 
as a strategic method of preventing profit loss.
76
  For example, the costs of 
switching banking providers could be lowered if consumers were entitled 
to switch and keep their bank account numbers, payment orders, and 
records.  However, the industry prefers keeping the costs high to preserve 
its profitability margins.
77
 
F. Regulation 
Investors’ informational interests are strictly protected by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a mighty regulatory agency 
with wide authority to determine the content, form, and timing of 
disclosure.
78
  The elaborate framework of disclosure rules developed by the 
SEC includes a web-based platform that is easily accessible to all with 
plain English uniform disclosures.
79
 
Consumers’ informational interests lie on contractual foundations.  
Thus, product information is scattered throughout separate sources of 
various credibility and impact, and is presented in widely different forms 
and languages.  Consumers interested in a product must bear the costs of 
assembling this information.  Corporations, which already have and can 
easily provide the information, typically choose to engage in commercial 
speech that creates emotional manipulation and vague branding on the one 
hand and information overload on the other.
80
  No single authority is in 
position to demand material information for products for the benefit of their 
users, and consumers are limited to claims of contractual misrepresentation, 
fraud, and to a lengthy and costly process of legal proceedings to seek 
remedies while overcoming the burden of the de minimis rule. Since 
consumers are widely dispersed, pursuing such proceedings is highly 
unlikely. 
Regulation’s preference toward investors is beyond ownership status.  
Shareholders are owners of the corporation, and disclosure to them is easily 
justifiable as part of their ownership and property rights in the incorporated 
asset.  Creditors, however, receive similar information management 
services to those granted to shareholders,
81
 despite having a contractual 
 
      76.   See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar supra note 75, at 152 (noting that exit hurts sellers and 
that some sellers worked to make exit costly through contractual provisions). 
      77.   See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar supra note 75, at 152 (noting that exit hurts sellers and 
that some sellers work to make exit costly through contractual provisions). 
     78.    See supra note 1 (discussing the securities regulation framework established by the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
     79.   See supra note 73 (discussing the SEC’s EDGAR platform). 
 80.  See discussion infra Part II section B.1. 
 81.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012) (defining a security as “any note,” with several 
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relationship with corporations that is similar to that of consumers.  The 
informational protection of creditors thus shows that the law protects 
investors as a preferred status.  An analysis of the choice process of 
consumers as compared to the investment allocation process shows that 
consumers are at least as vulnerable as investors.  Comparing the consumer 
product market to capital markets shows that market forces, regulation, and 
intermediaries are better protecting investors, and that consumers typically 
make their product research and choice unaided.  In the following part, this 
article provides an analysis of voluntary disclosures available in the 
consumer product market to evaluate the degree of informational protection 
provided to consumers by freedom of commercial speech. 
II. WHY IS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE NOT ENOUGH? 
We are surrounded by vast amounts of product and brand information.  
This part of the article provides a thorough analysis of product information 
markets, arguing that what consumers know is not enough and is at the 
same time too little and too much to affect consumers’ choice processes 
efficiently.  The analysis refers to sellers’ supply of product information on 
the one hand, and to consumers’ demand for product information on the 
other.  Recent trends of sustainability disclosures are also discussed, 
showing that they are not a better consumer choice process because of the 
limited scope, audience, and enforcement incentives. 
A. Supply of Product Information 
The two main generic groups that supply product information are:  (1) 
sellers and (2) past and present consumers.  The social allocation of product 
information is currently pursued mainly through freedom of speech.
82
  
Under this model, market forces determine the allocation of information 
between sellers and consumers – namely what sellers and consumers 
choose to share with each other voluntarily.  Due to incentive disparities 
between the two groups, sellers typically choose to share more information 
than consumers; sellers stand to gain from information sharing, which can 
increase their sales, enhance their reputation, and entrench their market 
share, while consumers’ gain from such information sharing is usually 
limited to their individual consumption capacity.  Commercial speech is 
 
exceptions); 15 U.S.C. § 78c (describing a security as “any note,” and proceeding to some 
exclusions). Any note with a maturity exceeding nine months comes within the statutory 
definition of a security. Id. § 78c (10). 
 82.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech . . . .”). 
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thus mainly speech for commercial purposes:  specifically, the purpose of 
affecting sales.
83
  Below I argue that the marketplace rule of dissemination 
of product information through commercial speech is resulting in market 
failure and thus justifies intervention. 
1. Consumers’ Commercial Speech 
Consumers’ accumulated experiences are a vast source of product 
information.  Past consumers know almost everything there is to know 
about a product, including its hidden highlights and most disturbing 
problems.  Had the market for product information been efficient, this vast 
amount of accumulated information would change hands and be easily 
forwarded to future consumers, who have yet to make their consumer 
choice.  Alas, a market failure on the supply side of information creates a 
hurdle for this efficient transaction.  Past and present consumers fail to 
efficiently forward their accumulated experiences to future consumers due 
to limited incentives, limited accessibility to communication mediums, 
limited accessibility to the information, and reliability barriers. 
a. Limited Incentives for Information Sharing 
The product information environment is structured asymmetrically in 
a way that allows sellers to dominate most content and forms of 
commercial speech.
84
  This asymmetry is intrinsic to the structure of 
merchandise business in a mass production society:  within each market 
segment, few sellers offer products to many consumers and consumers are 
dispersed, typically acting separately and independently as individuals or 
nuclear families.  Although sellers have strong incentives to use 
commercial speech as a means of sales promotion, consumers are much 
less inclined to use commercial speech simply because their stakes 
involved with any given product are typically low and bounded by the 
individual consumption scale.  This problem can be conceptualized as a 
 
 83.  Scanlon defines commercial speech with reference to the participant’s intent, 
stating, “expression by a participant in the market for the purpose of attracting buyers or 
sellers.”  Thomas M. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 519, 540-41 (1979).  I focus on speech for marketing purposes, meant to attract 
consumers, and more specifically, to persuade and otherwise affect them toward consuming 
products or services promoting the speaker’s interest. 
     84.    Hsiu-Yuan Tsao, Pierre Berthon, Leyland Pitt & Michael Parent, Brand Signal 
Quality of Products in an Asymmetric Online Information Environment:  An Experimental 
Study, 10 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 169, 169 (2011) (discussing seller strategies for exploiting 
the information asymmetry in the consumer products market). 
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problem of high transaction costs for information sharing,
85
 as well as a 
problem of collective action for the consumer community.
86
  Since 
individual consumers are numerous, each having a small stake of 
investment in any given product purchased, the consumer’s costs of 
commercial speech per given product individually outweigh the expected 
benefits, even when the accumulated interests of consumers as a group are 
indicating an opposite result.  It is individually rational for a consumer to 
undertake the costs of commercial speech only when her proportionate 
share of the expected collective consumers’ benefits from doing so exceeds 
the expected costs. 
b. Limited Accessibility to Communication Mediums 
These problems were extremely difficult to overcome in the traditional 
communication environment.  Traditionally, a scarce supply of 
opportunities in mass communication mediums such as newspapers, radio 
and television contribute to high costs of commercial speech.
87
  
 
 85.  This is a conventional framing for this problem.  Ronald Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase uses the case of environmental pollution to 
show the economic principle of transaction costs, and to suggest that the harmful costs of 
pollution should not be seen as externalities.  Id.  Rather, such costs result both from the 
production process and from people’s choice to live near the plant.  Rather than resulting 
from externalities of the factory, pollution is seen as stemming from a large number of acts 
and omissions on both sides.  If the parties were able to bargain with one another – the 
solution that they jointly prefer – an efficient result can be expected.  In theory, steel users 
(the factory’s consumers) and pollution sufferers might agree to share the cost of pollution 
(for example, through the installation of antipollution equipment).  “Transaction costs” are 
the costs of coming together to reach an agreement, and these costs prevent bargains from 
occurring.  Bargaining is impracticable because of transaction costs, and regulation may be 
used to overcome the problem of transaction costs and achieve an efficient arrangement.  
 86.  See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1st ed. 1982) (postulating 
that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions); TODD SANDLER, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992) (synthesizing the latest research on 
collective action).  The resulting disincentive to act is compounded by the free-rider 
problem: any one consumer may decide to save the costs of information sharing on the 
belief that others will do so and she will still be able to enjoy the benefits in her next 
purchases. 
 87.  KYLE BAGWELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING 69-83 (Columbia Univ. 
Dep’t of Econ. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 0506-01, 2005), available at 
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:115358. Interestingly, total advertising 
expenditures have risen in recent years.  While 20th century communication mediums were 
scarce and voiced only corporate commercial speech, new media makes it possible for 
consumers to voice their opinions in various channels of publicity, including web forums, 
Facebook, Whatsapp and other social media channels accessible to all.  See Mercedes 
Esteban Bravo, José M. Vidal-Sanz & Gökhan Yildirim, Expenditure Trends in US 
Advertising: Long-Term Effects and Structural Changes with New Media Introductions, 
(Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper No. 15, June 2012), available at 
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Accordingly, consumers’ inclination to use commercial speech was lower, 
simply because their accessibility to the communication mediums was 
scarce and severely limited.
88
  Much of what we hear is thus what sellers 
have spoken directly through promotional business sites and through online 
advertisements, or indirectly, through other agents and astroturfing.
89
  
Sellers thus quantitatively dominate the commercial speech arena. 
In this asymmetric setting, the Internet created a distinctive revolution 
by contributing to the democratization of information.  On the Internet, 
unlike in any traditional information medium, all users are free to become 
creators and suppliers of information, and not merely its end consumers.  
Thanks to the Internet, becoming a supplier of information, rather than 
merely its consumer, is cheap, easy, and accessible to all.
90
 
The Internet thus helped to democratize the product information 
market due to the strict equality of its users who are equal not only in 
access to information, and the equality in the opportunities of its creation 
and dissemination.
91
  Since commercial speech opportunities are distributed 
 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/wbrepe/wb121506.html (a historical analysis of advertisement 
expenditures in the U.S.).   
 88.  Howard Rheingold, Participatory Media Literacy (2008, retrieved November 
2014), available at https://www.socialtext.net/medialiteracy/index.cgi/  
 89.  “Astroturfing” is “the deceptive practice of presenting an orchestrated marketing or 
public relations campaign in the guise of unsolicited comments from members of the 
public.”  See Astroturfing Definition, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/astroturfing (last visited Oct. 27, 
2014).  European Legislation is an example of the regulation of marketplace rule 
information mechanism in the case of Internet astroturfing.  See Eur. Parl. & Council 
Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22 (EC) (stating that falsely claiming or creating the 
impression that the trader is not acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or 
profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer is a criminal offence).   
 90.  Unlike the traditional communication mediums, which served mainly to promote 
commercial speech opportunities of sellers as speakers, the Internet sets a social network for 
consumer empowerment: it is the first communication medium that gives consumers the 
opportunity to voice their opinions and review products and sellers.  A vast pool of opinions 
of prior consumers, often rated and aggregated, is available on the Internet.  Consumer 
rating is expanding through the Internet for a variety of services.  Many shopping sites 
include information about the rating previous consumers have given the offered product.  
For example, Amazon.com presents consumers with the average rating previous readers 
have given a certain book, including their comments and criticism.  Similarly, 
Tripadvisor.com offers its consumers average ratings and detailed reviews given by 
experienced consumers who have already used the food and lodging services surveyed by 
the site.  Recently, WellPoint Inc., a prominent health insurer in the U.S., has announced it 
would team up with Zagat—a purveyor of consumers’ restaurant and hotel ratings— to let 
health-plan members go online to rate and review their experiences with doctors.  See 
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Women to Watch (A Special Report) —- The 50 Women to Watch, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at R3 (describing the work of female leaders in top Internet 
companies). 
 91.  Equality – both in terms of access to information and in terms of expression 
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more equally on the Internet to sellers and consumers alike, the strength of 
the claim for asymmetry of access to information mediums weakens.
92
 
c. Limited Accessibility to Information 
The asymmetry of information between sellers and consumers is 
apparent in the allocation of information itself.  Sellers control virtually all 
available information regarding their offered products’ characteristics, 
ingredients, safety, applicability and features, whereas consumers—even as 
a collective group—hold only the information available from their 
accumulated experiences.  Often, accumulated experience is not enough to 
discover all there is to know about the product.
93
  Sellers choose what to 
tell consumers and how to tell it, and this choice, channeled through 
commercial speech, encompasses most of the available product 
information. 
 
opportunities – was indeed one of the originally arguments in favor of the Internet.  As early 
of 1996, John Perry Barlow stated that, “We are creating a world that all may enter without 
privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth; 
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter 
how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity.”  John Perry Barlow, 
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 
(Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.  Every consumer is free 
to contribute to public discourse from his experience and to voice his opinions on any seller; 
and every seller may respond to the criticism through the same venue.  Some Internet sites 
offering consumer reviews, also initiate on-line discussions between consumers and sellers, 
archived and presented for the benefit of future consumers. 
 92.  This claim requires a disclaimer: despite the democratic structure of Internet 
accessibility, asserting that the Internet abolishes the informational asymmetries between 
sellers and consumers would be an overstatement.  In fact, Internet users typically rely on 
few content sites, ultimately granting the owners and editors of such sites an inherent 
advantage in terms of commercial speech exposure and persuasion power.  Obviously, the 
power of owners and editors of a popular site is asymmetrical to that of an individual 
consumer criticizing the contents of such a site because the platform for the latter criticism 
is less popular and gives users less exposure.  Given these actual use patterns of consumers, 
it seems that the Internet is a virtual reflection of the traditional power and capital relations 
in the society, rather than an equal democracy of opinions.  Nonetheless, the Internet does 
give consumers a platform for documenting their experiences and opinions in an irreversible 
form that may reach other, future consumers; as such, the Internet gives consumers a larger 
stage than ever before.  
 93.  The abrupt decline in sales after news of a product scandal, or product recall, best 
demonstrate the effects of this asymmetry.  To illustrate, consider toys that include 
poisonous lead, putting the children playing with them at risk.  Consumers’ accumulated 
experience is not likely to discover such defects efficiently, because each individual 
consumer has considerable transaction costs to conduct private research.  However, the 
producing seller holds all information about the product’s ingredients and safety from the 
production date, and is in the lowest-cost position to detect and survey the product’s voyage 
through the marketing chain.  
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Here too, the Internet is revolutionary, allowing accessibility and 
immediate availability of masses of information, including opinions of 
previous consumers, to all consumers at any given time.  The information 
accumulated on the Internet is visible to all, and is a shared asset of Internet 
users throughout the world, crossing nationalities, cultures, and 
generations.  Consumers have much better accessibility to information 
thanks to the Internet, but they do not know all there is to know.
94
 
d. Limited Reliability 
The final barrier to information sharing between past and present 
consumers is overcoming the reliability question and assuring the integrity 
of the information shared.  Suppose all our needs for information were 
present in customer reviews available online; could we trust these as 
authentic and reliable?  This question is harder to answer because disguised 
marketing, e.g., astroturfing or undercover marketing,
95
 is playing a 
significant role in the marketing strategies of corporations.  Astroturfing is 
particularly prominent online, as chat rooms and forums for consumers 
easily mislead their users to perceive everyone as peers.  Disguised as 
authentic consumers who give sincere advice, sellers can affect future 
consumers and promote their sales while they are protected by the veil of 
anonymity at a very low cost and with a low risk of liability.
96
 
 
 94.  Not all the essential information is available on the Internet, and even the available 
information requires vast resources for processing and analysis. To illustrate, consider a 
purchase of an automobile: most consumers will want to know the total cost of ownership of 
the car, a price accumulating the average cost of maintenance as well as the miles per gallon 
expected utility.  Even a thorough investigation of all information sources available on the 
market would not reveal this information, which is held exclusively by the seller.  
 95.  See Eur. Parl. & Council Directive 2005, supra note 89, at 34.  
 96.  A well-known published example of undercover marketing is Sony Ericsson, who 
used stealth marketing in 2002, hired actors in major cities, and had them ask strangers to 
take their picture with a brand new picture phone while talking about how cool the new 
device was.  Robert Walker, The Hidden (in Plain Sight) Persuaders, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Dec. 5, 2004, at 68.  Undercover marketing can affect encyclopedias, as well as 
Wikipedia, which is a consumer-updated source of information, an encyclopedia based on 
the wisdom of the crowds, is, too, subject to manipulation.  Subjects of negative consumer 
reviews can push content below the fold by adding their own content to the top of their 
Wikipedia page, to push the authentic negative information down, or bury the negative 
information by masses of positive marketing propaganda to create information overload and 
noise and to make information retrieval harder for consumers.  See Jessica Bowman, What 
To Do When Your Company Wikipedia Page Goes Bad, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 27, 
2007, 9:46 AM), http://searchengineland.com/what-to-do-when-your-company-wikipedia-
page-goes-bad-11572 (explaining the breadth of marketing ideas for blurring past 
consumers’ authentic reviews). 
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2. Sellers’ Commercial Speech 
Most analyses of sellers’ incentives for disclosure assume perfect 
functioning of the market.  Under the assumption that product quality is 
reflected in prices, a key result in the literature on disclosure states that 
sellers are likely to voluntarily disclose product information; more 
specifically, sellers are likely to voluntarily disclose all information that 
can be verified without cost.
97
  In particular, sellers are likely to voluntarily 
disclose product information as a means of differentiating their own 
product and/or brand from others available on the market.
98
  The intuition 
behind this result is that if the seller does not disclose product information, 
he will not be able to charge surplus for the additional quality provided.  In 
the absence of information about product differentiation, consumers are 
expected to assume similar levels of quality for competing products; hence, 
sellers of above-average products are incentivized to disclose further 
information in order to distinguish their products from their lower-quality 
competitors.
99
  Theoretically, this scenario may result in a reversed 
“lemons” process
100
: if consumers assume non-disclosing sellers are 
offering lower quality products, more and more sellers would disclose to 
associate themselves with higher quality products. More sellers would 
disclose and the process would repeat itself until all types (except the 
lowest of quality) disclose.  Such process is expected to lower the average 
level of non-disclosing sellers, until every seller discloses.
101
  Disclosure is 
 
 97.  This result is rooted in the assumption of perfect functioning of the marketplace 
rule.  If prices fully reflect quality, sellers have incentive to disclose information about 
product quality so that they can charge adequate prices for their product. Absent such 
disclosure consumers will not pay the stated price since they would assume the worst about 
the product’s value.  Thus sellers, except those offering the lowest quality, have an incentive 
to voluntarily disclose information regarding their product.  If disclosure is costly, sellers 
are expected to voluntarily disclose only if their quality exceeds a threshold.  See W. Kip 
Viscusi, A Note on ‘Lemons’ Markets with Quality Certification, 9 BELL J. ECON. 277, 277-
79 (1978) (discussing quality certification as an option for high-quality sellers in certain 
markets); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. 
FIN. 323, 323-27 (1980) (explaining that sellers will always distinguish themselves if there 
is no transaction cost). 
     98.  See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private 
Disclosure about Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 464-65 (1981) (supporting the 
proposition that high-quality sellers have an incentive to voluntarily distinguish themselves). 
 99.  See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 503-06.  
   100.    See Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Varying Effects of Predatory 
Lending Laws on High-Cost Mortgage Applications, 89  FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 
39, 43-44 (2007) (putting forth the “reverse lemons” hypothesis in the context of the 
mortgage market). 
 101.  See Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about 
Product Quality, supra note 97, at 39 (implying that regulatory intervention in disclosure is 
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considered an effective measure because a key theoretical study predicts 
that if informed consumers reach a critical mass, sellers in sufficiently 
competitive markets will have an incentive to cater to the needs of these 
informed buyers and thus confer benefits to the non-informed consumers as 
well.
102
 
However, product quality is only reflected in prices if the market 
functions efficiently,
103
 and such efficient functioning requires rational, 
deliberating consumers, who are actively searching, processing and 
comparing product knowledge, and in turn, can translate their product 
knowledge into product quality and finally into price.  When consumers 
fall short of this standard and fail to understand sellers’ disclosures, 
disclosure is less likely to occur voluntarily:  under such conditions, sellers 
of higher quality products will not be able to distinguish themselves from 
sellers of lower quality products, and low-quality sellers will have 
incentives to hide their quality.
104
 
Despite these theoretical assertions, empirical studies show that the 
predicted theory of voluntary disclosure is not validated in practice.  For 
example, in a study of salad dressing labels conducted in the U.S. prior to 
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act’s
105
 mandatory disclosure 
requirements, only 9% of firms selling high fat salad dressing chose to 
disclose fat content on the product’s label, whereas all sellers of low fat 
salad dressing voluntarily disclosed.
106
  Sales of high fat dressings 
eventually declined after regulatory intervention that imposed mandatory 
disclosure rules.
107
  Other empirical studies examined the effects of 
 
completely unnecessary as eventually all sellers would disclose to signal quality).  It is also 
backed up by some empirical works: George Benston, for example, compared the pre- and 
post-legislation disclosure made by firms prior to the adoption of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act.  George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An 
Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144-45 (1973) 
(finding that no significant price effect resulted from the new mandated disclosure and 
concluding that voluntary disclosure prior to the act was sufficiently efficient). 
 102.  Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
   103.   THOMAS A. DURKIN & GREGORY E. ELLIEHAUSEN, TRUTH IN LENDING:  THEORY, 
HISTORY, AND A WAY FORWARD 27 (2011) 
 104.  This scenario is typically called market for lemons, since the marketplace rule 
applied here creates a race to the bottom on product quality: no seller has incentives to 
invest in higher quality products when higher quality cannot translate to higher prices.  See 
generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488-500 (1970) (explaining the market for lemons). 
 105.  Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, §§ 1-10, 104 
Stat. 2353-67 (1990) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2014)).  
 106.  Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: 
An analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651 (2000). 
 107.  Id.  
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informed minorities, showing that only about one in one-thousand online 
shoppers chose to become informed and read the contract, a number far 
below the critical mass Schwartz and Wilde seek.
108
  These empirical 
studies also found that increasing contract accessibility does not result in an 
economically significant increase in readership or a sufficient number of 
informed consumers to create an informed minority.
109
 
Indeed, models that examine how the market functions for product 
information given to consumers who do not understand disclosures predict 
that, if the number of informed consumers is insufficient to deter low-
quality sellers from disclosing and overcharging, the threat of losing the 
informed consumers’ business is too weak.
110
 In the resulting equilibrium, 
low-quality sellers are expected to charge a price commensurate with high 
quality sellers.  As Fishman and Hagerty state, “with no informed 
customers, price cannot signal quality.”
111
  Sellers might not disclose 
positive or negative product information due to insufficient incentives.
112
  A 
seller is unlikely to disclose positive information relevant to all brands in a 
certain category because the disclosing seller would both share the benefits 
of disclosure with its competitors and solely carry the advertisement 
costs.
113
 Likewise, sellers are not likely to disclose negative information 
 
 108.  A key theoretical result predicts that if informed consumers reach a critical mass, 
sellers in sufficiently competitive markets will have an incentive to cater to the needs of 
these informed buyers and thus confer benefits to non-informed consumers.  See Alan 
Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 659-62 (1979) (explaining that 
information problems in consumer markets raise difficult issues regarding how to determine 
and fix market imperfections).  See generally Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & 
David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics 
Approach to Standard Form Contracts, (N.Y.U Ctr. for Law, Economics and Organization, 
Research Paper No. 09-40, 2009) (casting doubt on the “informed minority” hypothesis, 
which holds that in competitive markets, an informed minority of buyers who are term-
conscious is sufficient to discipline sellers from using unfavorable boilerplate terms). 
 109.  See Mathios, supra note 106. 
 110.  See generally Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus 
Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 45, 53 (2003) (analyzing the benefits and disadvantages of rules mandating the 
disclosure of sellers’ information).  Understanding a disclosure, in this regard, means 
understanding its implications.  A consumer can be aware that a disclosure has been made, 
and that the information is available, without comprehending its consequences and 
implications.  For example, a consumer may observe a nutritional food label without 
comprehending the health consequences associated with consuming the food. 
 111.  Fishman & Hagerty, supra note 110, at 45, 53. 
 112.  See generally Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 31 (examining the 
complexities of how to properly and efficiently inform consumers and the ways in which the 
legal system has attempted to solve this issue). 
 113.  Disclosures of category benefits may be beneficial enough to overcome this 
externality in cases of a monopoly or a large market share.  
AZGAD-TROMER_ FINAL (ARTICLE 5).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:30 PM 
2014]     CASE FOR CONSUMER-ORIENTED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 257 
 
about a certain brand in a particular product category since such a 
disclosure would be expected to benefit all substitute suppliers, while no 
particular seller is likely to internalize the benefits of the disclosure.
114
  
Sellers are likely to count only their own profits as a benefit, and they do 
not count the additional profits obtained by other firms and the additional 
consumer surplus.  From the individual seller’s perspective, a free-riding 
externality can be beneficial to society.  In determining what information to 
disclose, a seller is likely to ignore these benefits and balance only its 
individually attained, internalized benefits against the costs of providing 
information.
115
  The result is undersupply of product information.
116
 
The practice of obscuring the available information, often in the form 
of hidden add-on prices, thrives “even in highly competitive markets, even 
in markets with costless advertising, and even when the shrouding 
generates allocational inefficiencies.”
117
  To illustrate this argument, 
consider the consumer credit market.  Since credit information tends to be 
complicated, consumers are typically imperfectly informed regarding the 
credit products they purchase. 
118
 Sellers, who provide that credit, are in a 
position to become the cheapest providers of information.  Provision of 
voluntary information could be used to correct mistakes of consumer 
misperception.  But, as Bar-Gill and Warren show,
119
 insufficient incentives 
and the collective action problem are significant obstacles for such 
voluntary consumer education: 
 
If seller A reduces this risk and invests in educating consumers 
about the benefits of her superior product, then seller A will 
attract a lot of business and make a supracompetitive profit. But 
 
   114.  See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 503-04 (discussing free-rider 
problems). 
 115.  See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 507-09 (explaining that the 
incentive to disclose optimally can be restored if sellers obtain sufficient market power to 
capture most of the benefits of the information).  Market power can stem “from a 
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure or from a perceived monopoly caused by 
differentiation” of the seller’s brand from other competing products.”  Id. at 504.  While 
they supply better incentives for consumer information disclosure, these market structures 
are imperfectly competitive and inevitably create other imperfections in the performance of 
the product market.  Id. at 491-539.  
   116.  See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 504 (“The general effect of these 
externalities [the free-rider problem] is to lead to an undersupply of general information.”). 
 117.  Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and 
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 505 (2006). 
   118.    Barr-Gill   &  Warren,  supra note 37, at 8-11. 
 119.  Barr-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 11-20. See also John Y. Campbell, 
Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1554 (2006) (describing the collective action problem 
that prevents sellers from educating consumers in the mortgage market). 
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this is not an equilibrium.  After seller A invests in consumer 
education, all the other sellers will free-ride on seller A’s efforts. 
They will similarly reduce the product risk and compete away the 
profit that seller A would have made.  Anticipating such a 
response, seller A will realize that she will not be able to recoup 
her investment.  Seller A will thus be less likely to improve the 
safety of her product, and instead will continue to offer a higher-
risk product.
120
 
 
Board suggests that sellers may choose not to disclose, despite a 
competitive environment, if disclosure would result in fiercer competition 
with rivals.
121
  If one high quality firm chooses to disclose, others must 
trade off the increase in competition and resulting fall in price if they also 
disclose, with the effect on sales and reduced product quality, as perceived 
by consumers, if they do not disclose.
122
  If the sales’ effect and perceived 
decrease in product quality outweigh the increase in competition, the seller 
will prefer not to disclose.
123
  However, when some high quality sellers 
choose not to disclose, this may generate a positive externality for low 
quality sellers.
124
  These low quality sellers may pool together and take 
advantage of consumers’ misperceptions of quality levels.
125
 
Undersupply of product information can also result from the products’ 
public good properties.  This occurs when information used by consumers 
generates an external benefit to uninformed consumers.
126
  These 
uninformed consumers shop randomly and enjoy the higher quality induced 
by the patronage of informed consumers.
127
  This externality implies that 
not enough information will be produced, even in an otherwise efficient 
market.
128
 
Another market failure in the supply side of product information 
involves reliability:  there is not always sufficient incentive to supply 
truthful information.  False positive claims and/or withholding of negative 
information can be beneficial to a seller, and thus considered optimal, if 
 
 120.  Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 18. 
 121.  Oliver Board, Competition and Disclosure, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 198-99 (2009). 
   122.    Id. at 198. 
   123.    Id. 
   124.    Id. 
   125.    Id. 
   126. See generally MURALI PRASAD PRANTA, BUSINESS, CONSUMER AND THE 
GOVERNMENT: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 25 (2001) (discussing public good 
properties of information and its under supply amongst consumers) 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See generally Steven Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 240, 240 (1976) (arguing that when consumers have imperfect information, the 
market structure is not perfect competition, but rather, monopolistic competition).  
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consumers can sustainably believe them.
129
  False advertising as a strategy 
can be worthwhile, especially for sellers of material products that involve 
ad hoc purchases and do not require long-term relationships with repeating 
consumers.  Online consumer reviews are one means of mitigating the risk 
of false advertising because sellers of material products are often rated on 
retailer websites for their reliability.
130
 However, as Bar-Gill and Warren 
note, this may only be a partial solution since consumers must still 
subscribe some publications, like Consumer Reports, and, most 
importantly, read the reports.
131
 
The difficulty of supplying reliable information poses a significant 
hurdle when sellers lack a standardized measure or benchmark against 
which products can be compared.  In many cases, sellers’ voluntary 
disclosure means little without a backdrop to compare the underlying 
product whose features are disclosed.  One example is the securities 
market. A company’s statement regarding its expected return on investment 
is meaningless to a potential investor without a benchmark measure of 
industry or market performance for comparison.
132
  For this reason, 
 
   129.   Beales,  Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 505-06. 
 130. eBay is one prominent example. eBay offers consumers the opportunity to rate 
sellers on four different categories: accuracy of the item description; consumer satisfaction 
with the seller’s communication; shipping time for the item; and reasonableness of the 
shipping and handling charges. Seller Ratings, EBAY.COM, http://pages.ebay.com/help/ 
feedback/detailed-seller-ratings.html Sellers are rated on a five star scale on each of these 
four categories, with five stars being the highest rating and one star the lowest. Id. In 
addition, consumers leave detailed narratives of their experiences and go into more specific 
depth. Id. Detailed seller ratings are anonymous, and sellers cannot see which buyer gave 
them a certain rating. Id.  Consumers are thus free to be open about their buying 
experiences.  
   131.  Bar-Gill  &  Warren, supra note 37,  at 14-15.   
 132.  CLYDE P. STICKNEY,  ROMAN L. WEIL, KATHERINE SCHIPPER, & JENNIFER FRANCIS, 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES 244 (9th ed. 
2000) (describing how to analyze and use a standard financial statement in order to make 
informed financial decisions).  Stickney et al. explain that a similar argument is made for a 
uniform accounting standard for investors: 
 
Readers may have difficulty answering questions about a firm’s profitability and 
risk from the raw information in financial statements.  . . . Ratios aid financial 
statement analysis because they conveniently summarize data . . . [but] [r]atios, 
by themselves out of context, provide little information.  For example, does a 
rate of return on common shareholders’ equity of 8.6 percent indicate 
satisfactory performance? After calculating the ratios the analyst must compare 
them with some standard . . . [such as] [t]he corresponding ratio for a similar 
firm in the same industry . . . [or] [t]he average ratio for other firms in the same 
industry[.] 
 
Id. at 233-34.  But see, Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do they Justify 
Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 703 (2004) (arguing that the comparative 
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securities regulation requires mandatory uniform conventions for financial 
statements and sees this mandatory uniform convention as central to its 
purpose
133
 
Without mandatory standards of disclosure, every seller would 
disclose in her own terms, language and format.  This would lead to market 
dynamics in which sellers would have no credible disclosure capacity or 
technology, as well as insufficient public quality assurances.  Under such 
dynamics, as Akerlof’s model of market for lemons suggests, only the 
average quality of the goods will be considered and fairly priced by 
consumers, and above average quality products will be driven out of the 
market.
134
 
At the other end, market failures on the supply side of product 
information create incentives for information overload.  Sellers are 
incentivized to provide and disseminate more information, as long as their 
own cost in so doing does not exceed their expected gain.
135
  Since sellers 
gain when consumers switch brands, they are expected to provide further 
information aimed at incentivizing consumers to switch to a different 
brand, while losses occur for competitors and society as a whole.
136
  Under 
such constraints, the losses to competitors can exceed the consumer surplus 
from switching brands, and the result is the overprovision of information.
137 
The possibility of information overload is further enhanced by an 
incentive to use abstract and vague commercial speech.  In general, 
competition is expected to skew toward the easily observable 
characteristics of products.
138
  Sellers are thus incentivized to invest in 
brands and signals, rather than in technical, detailed descriptions of the 
product’s characteristics, since these are the factors that affect consumer 
choice.
139
  This process is a generalization of a lemon’s equilibrium in the 
markets.
140
  If vague and abstract commercial speech is more easily 
observable and memorable by consumers, sellers have no incentive to 
 
advantage for investors may not always justify mandatory disclosure because firms may 
voluntarily disclose information to obtain information about other firms). 
 133.  See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 7-9 (5th 
ed., 2006), (discussing continuous disclosure and other disclosure provisions).  
   134.    Akerlof, supra note 104, at 488-490. 
   135.    Beales, Craswell  & Salop, supra note 31, at 509 
   136.    Id. 
 137.  Id.  at 508-09. 
 138.  One example is a car dealership that sells used cars. If cleanliness of cars is more 
easily observable and comparable by potential buyers, cleaner cars are expected to sell at a 
premium.  Therefore, sellers are incentivized to over-invest in cleaning their inventory of 
cars, rather than investing in hidden, or less observable aspects of their underlying product 
quality.  Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 31, at 511.  
   139.    Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 510. 
   140.    Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31 at 510. 
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invest in educating consumers regarding the true, detailed nature of their 
products. As a result, sellers do not invest in educating consumers.
141
  This 
creates an information environment that results in spurious product 
differentiation and branding premiums, thus raising prices for functionally 
equivalent brands.
142
 
The frequent use of boilerplate terms and standard form contracts in 
the consumer product market obscures product information through added 
complexity and information overload.  Through the artificial framework of 
form contracts, sellers create an environment of high transaction costs for 
informed consumer purchasers.
143
  As Gilo and Porat suggest, sellers might 
achieve several goals through this artificial complexity and informational 
overload, including:  segmentation of consumers and price 
discrimination;
144
 stabilization of cartels and obstruction of competition;
145
 
a façade of the consumer contract that disguises its true nature from 
potential consumers and third parties;
146
 and a credible signal of non-
negotiability, that creates a self inflicted barrier on negotiation.
147
 
B. Market Failure in the Demand for Product Information 
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers “often fail to make 
 
   141.   See generally, Bar-Gill  & Warren, supra note 37, at 17-20 (discussing why sellers 
do not tend to educate consumers). 
   142.    Beales, Crasewell & Salop, supra note 31, at 510. 
   143.   See David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard Form 
Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers and Anti 
Competitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 986 (2006) (suggesting that sellers use 
language as a screening method for unwanted customers and use a complicated contracting 
process as a means to screen repeated consumers from other consumers, who cannot afford 
to pay the high transaction costs of contracting, as well as the use of boilerplate terms to 
create price discrimination when benefits and discount are hidden between the lines of long 
contract language). 
 144.  Id.  
 145.  The complexity of terms creates higher transaction costs for consumers who want 
to compare similar products by rival sellers.  Thus, it leads to “an equilibrium in which 
competition is less fierce, and profits [are], accordingly, higher.” Gilo & Porat, supra note 
144, at 1006.  As Gilo and Porat argue, the use of complex form contracts and boilerplate 
terms to reduce competition is prominent and sustainable not only in monopolistic markets, 
but also in oligopolistic ones, if the long-term loss from a price war outweighs the short-
term profit from price cutting. Id. 
 146.  Gilo and Porat discuss cases where boilerplate terms in form contracts are used to 
hide salient features of the contract, such as exit possibilities from a services contract or 
insurance for high-risk products. Id. at 1014-15.  In these cases, form contracts are used to 
create a fair impression and thus provide sustainability of their terms for the respective 
sellers, thereby minimizing the likelihood of a court intervention or negative public impact.  
Id. at 987. 
 147.  Id. 
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rational decisions even within the bounds of the information they have 
acquired.”
148
  While rational actors would actively search and process 
product information and trigger competition that would make for an 
efficient market, real-life consumers fall short of such ability, creating a 
market failure on the demand-side of product information.  Due to their 
bounded rationality, bounded will power, and psychological reaction to 
information overload, consumers often do not create sufficient disclosure 
incentives for an efficient market of product information.  In the following 
section, I briefly survey some of the reasons for the demand side market 
failure. 
1. Information Overload 
In product information, more can often become less.  Having the 
information is not enough:  even if all potentially relevant information was 
theoretically obtainable and verifiable through sufficient research efforts, 
such availability is likely to have limited social effect.  This is because the 
resources required for comprehensive product research and analysis are 
greater than the expected individual benefit that is likely to result.
149
  The 
cognitive
150
 and emotional
151
 burdens placed on the consumer in evaluating 
 
 148.  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 216 (1995) (citing evidence). 
 149.  This conclusion follows from rational models of the decision process.  For 
example, according to one model, suggested by Stigler, a consumer is likely to invest in 
studying the alternatives up to the point where the costs of additional research would be 
higher than the surplus benefit expected.  See George J. Stigler, The Economics of 
Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213-25 (1961) (analyzing the economic effect on the market 
of the search and identification of sellers and the discovery of their prices).  Another model, 
introduced by Simon, suggests that the choice between alternatives would be made by the 
product’s compliance with the consumer expectations as defined ex ante: the consumer is 
expected to choose not the best product, but rather the first sufficiently good product; that is, 
the first available product that complied with her ex ante expectation.  See Herbert A. 
Simon, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 1-17 (3rd ed. 1976); see also Eisenberg, supra, note 
148, at 211-25 (discussing limits on cognition that prevent consumers from making rational 
choices).   
 150.  Cognitive limitations are augmented by the complexity of the available 
information, the varying reliability of the information’s sources, and its varying forms of 
presentation.  For a discussion of cognitive limitations, see Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral 
Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 120 (2007) (applying 
behavioral economic findings of cognitive limitations to challenge assumption of utility 
maximization in contract law); James R. Bettman, Mary F. Luce & John W. Payne, 
Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 187-217 (1998) 
(developing framework of constructive choice given consumers’ limited processing 
capacity); DeNisi & Elaydi, supra note 33, at 50 (discussing both cognitive biases and lack 
of complete information in consumer decision-making); Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty, supra note 33, at 1124-31 (explaining generally several cognitive biases 
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the masses of available information are too heavy to instrument and allow 
daily investigation of the various product alternatives, each with an 
increasing number of data regarding complex characteristics schemes.  On 
an individual level, the costs of such analysis per product exceed its 
expected benefits.
152
 
Indeed, empirical research suggests that when available information 
exceeds the consumer’s information processing capacity, the consumer has 
difficulties in identifying the relevant information,
153
 exercises increased 
selectiveness in processing available information, thereby ignoring a 
significant portion of it,
154
 confronts difficulties in identifying the 
relationship between details and overall perspective,
155
 requires more time 
to reach a decision,
156
 and generally reaches a suboptimal decision that 
compromises the accuracy of her autonomous choice.
157
  The benefits of 
 
present in individual decision-making and judgment of an outcome’s likelihood).  
 151.  Consumers conduct emotional trade-offs when making a choice.  See Luce, 
Bettman & Payne, supra note 33 (discussing the importance of emotional trade-offs in 
decision-making and what makes some trade-offs more emotionally difficult than others); 
Lisa Watson & Mark T. Spence, Causes and Consequences of Emotions on Consumer 
Behaviour: A Review and Integrative Cognitive Appraisal Theory, 41 EUR. J. MARKETING  
487 (2007)(explaining how an integrated cognitive appraisal theory can be used to 
understand the causes of emotions).  
 152.  Empirical literature calls this phenomenon “information overload” and defines it in 
several ways, all pointing to the masses of available information beyond what an individual 
subject’s cognitive and emotional capacities allow her to process. See generally, Paul A. 
Herbig & Hugh Kramer, The Effect of Information Overload on the Innovation Choice 
Process: Innovation Overload, 11 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 45 (1994) (discussing 
information overload). 
 153.  Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some Contested Issues, 14 
J. MARKETING RES. 569 (1977). 
 154.  See generally. Herbig & Kramer, supra note 153, at 46 (explaining that information 
overload can have adverse effects on consumers’ decision-making abilities); Claudia 
Klausegger, Rudolf R. Sinkovics & Huan “Joy” Zou, Information Overload: a Cross-
national Investigation of Influence Factors and Effects, 25 MARKETING INTELLIGENCE & 
PLAN. 691, 709 (2007) (demonstrating negative correlation of information overload with 
fulfillment of job responsibilities); Paul R. Sparrow, Strategy and Cognition: Understanding 
the Role of Management Knowledge Structures, Organizational Memory and Information 
Overload, 8 CREATIVITY & INNOVATION MGMT. 140, 144 (1999) (discussing how, when 
faced with large volumes of information, managers tend to neglect large portions of 
information and try to punctuate its flow in predictable ways).  
 155.  Susan C. Schneider, Information Overload: Causes and Consequences, 7 HUM. 
SYS. MGMT. 143, 143-53 (1987).  
 156.  Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 432, 
433 (1984).  
 157.  Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 419, 427 (1982).  See also Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the 
Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 
436-40 (1984) (showing empirically that consumers can be overloaded and defining limits 
on the number of alternatives and attributes that consumers can process without 
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acquiring product information often fail to exceed the costs.
158
 
Once information overload is detected, it is interesting to ask why 
consumers do not demand simple and accessible disclosure.  For an 
individual consumer, the costs of making such a demand outweigh its 
potential benefit
159
, and collective action problems
160
 make a public claim 
hard to achieve.  Moreover, voicing a concern about accessible information 
requires some awareness of the costs and mal-effects of information 
overload, and such awareness may be present in fewer consumers than 
those who need informational protection.  Optimism and overconfidence 
make it natural for many consumers to trust their ability to process product 
information rather than acknowledge that the effort required is not 
reasonable, even if potentially possible to overcome.
161
  Demanding that 
sellers simplify their information entails an acknowledgement of one's own 
limitations, imposing a psychological cost on consumers making such a 
request.
162
 
 
experiencing the dysfunctional consequences of information overload); see also Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1220 (2003) (discussing generally behavioral economic theory of 
choice).  One question arising from this (concise) description of information overload’s 
effects is the definition of accuracy in consumer decision-making.  An underlying 
assumption of the dysfunctional effects of information overload seems to be that the 
consumer’s aim is preconceived and predetermined before she begins to consider her 
purchase opportunities.  This assumption seems to be partially incorrect because consumers 
do not always know in advance exactly what they want.  Recent studies in cognitive 
psychology show that people’s ability to forecast their future happiness (or utility, in 
economic terms) is contingent and partial.  See DANIEL TODD GILBERT, STUMBLING ON 
HAPPINESS 18-19 (2006); Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: 
Experiencing the Future, 317 SCI. 1351, 1352 (2007) (explaining the various conditions that 
must be met in order for a person’s present hedonic experience to be a reliable predictor of 
their future hedonic experience).  Hence, the accuracy of an actual consumer choice is to be 
determined in relation with a dynamic model of our preconceived desire, rather than a static 
preconception of the desired good.  Since this dynamic model of desire conception is also 
affected by the context within which the choice is made, including the information 
environment, information overload may affect the consumer’s perception of the desired 
good, making the discrepancy between the preconceived desire and the actual choice harder 
to detect and to measure. 
 158.  See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON 
CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 181 (1968) (analyzing formally how costly information is to 
acquire).  
   159.    Id. 
   160.    See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the collective action problem 
in the consumer community). 
   161.    See supra Part II.B.2, notes 163-168 and accompanying text. 
 162.  For a detailed explanation of this cost, see infra Part II.B.2.  
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2. Optimism and Overconfidence 
Consumers are unrealistically optimistic and systematically fail to 
accurately evaluate risks and probabilities of success.
163
  Nearly ninety 
percent of drivers believe they drive better than average,
164
 while ninety-
seven percent of consumers believe that they are either average or above in 
their ability to avoid accidents with bicycles.
165
  Even when consumers are 
explicitly warned about product risk, they are unlikely to internalize and 
incorporate such risks in their consumer choices.
166
  For example, only 
three percent of consumers who were informed of the risks associated with 
bleach and drain cleaner considered their home to present an above-average 
risk for hand burn and child poisoning from the use of drain cleaner, gas 
poisoning, or injury to children from the use of bleach; half of the 
consumers believed their house to pose average risk, while the other half 
believed their house was lower than average risk.
167
  Since consumers fail 
to understand and internalize products’ risks and the likelihood of their 
occurrence, they are not likely to pay for better, safer products, which is 
necessary in order to form a competitive market that will create sufficient 
incentives for suppliers to invest in minimizing the risks.
168
 
3. Framing and Rules of Thumb 
For efficient functioning of the market for product information, it is 
necessary to assume invariance—i.e., that a consumer’s choice between 
two options should not depend on how such choice is characterized and 
 
 163.  This is a well-documented human fallibility. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, 
Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 
806 (1980) (discussing surveys concerning automobile accidents, crime, and disease that 
suggest people are unrealistically optimistic about the future).  
 164.  Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 
47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981). 
 165.  W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND 
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 95-106 (1987).  Overconfidence and 
optimism are documented across all aspects of life.  For example, people who were about to 
get married were overconfident about their divorce-related prospects as compared to the 
rates of the entire population; even when the median of respondents predicted that fifty 
percent of the population gets divorced, the median of respondents predicted their own 
chances as zero percent.  Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is 
Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993).  In general, most people think they can do better than others 
and perceive themselves as immune from hazards and risks.  
 166.  See VISCUSI AND MAGAT, supra note 165, at 93-97.  
 167.  Id.  
   168.    Id. 
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presented, or framed.
169
  Rational consumers should not be affected by 
different presentations of the same information; rather they should be able 
to drill down to the essence of the information, and take all relevant facts 
into account.
170
  Real-life consumers, however, rarely fulfill this 
criterion.
171
 
One example of the framing effect is loss aversion.  A series of 
experiments showed that when something is framed as a loss, it is generally 
perceived as being more costly than if it were framed as an equivalent 
absence of gain; this is because rather than assigning specific values to 
objects, people vary in their value estimation based on the default, or base-
line allocation.
172
  Other prominent examples of the framing effect are 
systematic biases, or heuristics, which were identified by Amos Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman in the 1970s.
173
  Tversky and Kahneman 
demonstrated that anchoring, availability, and representativeness 
systemically bias human judgment.
174
 Anchors influence consumer choice 
by suggesting a starting point for the thought process: Tversky and 
Kahneman show that people’s decisions are influenced significantly by the 
immediate figure, question, or experience preceding the decision-
 
   169.   Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 4 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 
2000)  [hereinafter, Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice]. 
   170.    Id. 
 171.  Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, at 210 (noting that consumers’ actual 
behavior often violates invariance); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The 
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981) (discussing 
the effects of the different ways of framing problems on preference) [hereinafter Tversky & 
Kahneman, Psychology of Choice].  
 172.  Consider this experiment: a class is randomly divided into two groups.  Half the 
students are given a coffee mug and the other half are instructed to try to trade for their 
classmates’ mugs. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1330-31 
(1990).   Efficient market functioning and utility theory would predict that mugs would end 
up spread randomly in the class because the group who gained them as a default would trade 
with the other group, so that the result would be even distribution of the mugs between these 
two groups (there is no reason to assume an inherent preference for the mugs within the first 
group, as the class is divided randomly). However, loss aversion and the framing effect 
make for a completely different result. Id. at 1343. The group that received the mugs 
requires twice as much as others are willing to pay for it.  Id. at  1338. 
 173.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208-09 (1973) [hereinafter Tversky 
& Kahneman, Availability] (discussing the subjective biases that result through the use of an 
availability heuristic); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 33 (discussing systematic error in 
commonly-used heuristics, including representativeness, availability of instances or 
scenarios, and adjustment from an anchor).  
 174.  See Tversky & Kahneman, Availability, supra note 173, at 208-09 (providing an 
overview of a study showing the impact of anchoring, availability, and representativeness on 
human judgment). 
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making.
175
  Human judgment in general, including consumer choice, is 
considerably influenced by the comparable data and scenarios available to 
the memory or imagination.
176
  Finally, Tversky and Kahneman show that 
people tend to base decisions on some subset of data they judge to be 
representative, leading to systematic erroneous judgments.
177
  In the 
product markets, the subset of the relevant data that is used as a shortcut to 
a comprehensive search for the facts is often the brand name. 
These works show that, rather than making independent decisions that 
are isolated from their context, humans use rules of thumb for their 
decision-making, subjecting the resulting choice to deep influence by ways 
in which alternatives are framed.  Therefore, framing plays a meaningful 
role in consumer markets.  In a variety of consumer contexts, sellers use 
framing effects to increase prices and reduce efficiency and consumer 
welfare.  To illustrate, consider the effects of “add-on” pricing practices:  
sellers artificially divide products to several different charges, advertising a 
base price for a product and then offer additional “add-ons” at the time of 
sale.
178
  Even in e-commerce involving search engines, which can be 
expected to be highly competitive, sellers create artificial complexity and 
obfuscate product information so as to increase sales based on consumers’ 
 
 175. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 33, at 1128-29 
(discussing anchoring effects)..To illustrate, consider this experiment: subjects were asked 
two questions: (a) How happy are you? (b) How often are you dating?  When asked in this 
order, the correlation between the responses for these two questions was quite low, but when 
the question order was reversed, so that the dating question preceded the happiness question 
the correlation jumped significantly (from 0.12 to 0.66). Fritz Strack, Leonard L. Martin & 
Norbert Schwarz, Priming and Communication: Social Determinants of Information Use in 
Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 429, 437 (1988).  
 176. See Taversky & Kahneman, Availability supra note 173, at 207-09 (discussing the 
availability heuristic. The availability heuristic is commonly demonstrated by decisions to 
buy insurance: the spatial and temporal proximity of disasters is most influential in that 
regard, such that consumers typically choose to hedge, or buy insurance, against familiar 
and easily accessible risks. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra 
note 33, at 1128 (discussing how the ability to imagine a future event impacts and risk-
taking). 
    177.  See Taversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 33, at 1124-
27 (providing a general discussion about representativeness). Representativeness is the 
tendency to judge the likelihood of an event based on its similarity to a present event, while 
ignoring other relevant facts; or, the tendency to judge characteristics of an object based on 
its similarity to an image or stereotype. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, 
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 49-50 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).  
 178.  Consider examples such as: a printer and ink, a hotel and Internet connection, and a 
flight and airport taxes. See Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-On Pricing, 120 Q.J. ECON. 585 
(2005) (discussing various examples of firms using add-ons).  
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confusion and bounded rationality.
179
  Spiegler shows that, in general, 
sellers respond to the bounded rationality of consumers with an increased 
effort to obfuscate, rather than with more competitive pricing.
180
 
The result is that the surrounding narrative of a product sales point 
significantly influences consumer choice, thereby creating a market failure 
on the demand side of product information.  Sellers, in turn, have 
incentives to create a manipulative environment during the selling 
experience, using the framing effects and heuristics in branding techniques 
in order to influence consumer choice, rather than providing consumers 
with legible and easily comprehendible product information, as rational 
consumers would require. 
4. Bounded Will-Power 
Market failure on the demand side of product information often occurs 
despite consumers’ awareness of their interests—due to psychological, 
rather than cognitive, limitations.  Real-life consumers often make choices 
that the rational consumer would avoid because their will-power does not 
suffice for better decisions, which would require actively searching for and 
comparing the alternatives.
181
  This occurs when consumers mindlessly 
choose products, follow the herd in their purchases, or fail to alter the 
situation and prefer the default option they are using.
182
 
Rational consumers would always prefer more options.
183
  Real-life 
consumers are, however, often made worse off by a multitude of 
alternatives because they cannot resist the temptation to consume products 
that are readily available, or immediately satisfactory, while being harmful 
 
 179.  See Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price 
Elasticities on the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 438 (2009) (discussing obfuscation and 
the possibility that many firms use intentionally confusing websites in order to trick 
consumers who use search engines).  
 180.  Ran Spiegler, Competition Over Agents With Boundedly Rational Expectations, 1 
THEORETICAL ECON. 207, 219-220 (2006). 
   181.    See Bar-Gill  &  Warren, supra note 37, at 12 (explaining that imperfectly rational 
consumers might not seek out information because they do not think that they need more 
information or because they think the unknown information is “trivial, irrelevant, or 
insufficiently important to justify the cost of its acquisition.”). 
   182.   See generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 12 (positing reasons for why 
consumers may remain uninformed about products). 
 183.  This conclusion follows from rational models of the decision process, see supra 
note 149 and accompanying text; see also Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, Gur Huberman & Wei 
Jiang, How Much Choice is Too Much? Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in 
PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, 83, 84 (Olivia 
S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004) (discussing the historical presumption that 
consumers perceive more choice as better). 
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in the longer term.
184
  Empirical works repeatedly show that humans 
systematically fail to self-regulate their consumption when tempted or 
manipulated by suppliers.
185
  Psychologists distinguish between two 
processing systems, which correspond to intuition and reason.
186
  These 
two-system models of processing are mostly referred to as System 1 and 
System 2.
187
  Decisions relying on System 1 processes often rely on a 
spontaneous, automatic, un-conscious process and correspond to 
intuition.
188
  Decisions relying on System 2 processes are deliberate, 
controlled, skillful, and correspond to intellectual reasoning.
189
  It is System 
1 that we seek to restrain in order to fulfill our longer-term goals.
190
 
Consumers often make decisions mindlessly, without allocating 
sufficient processing resources to access cognitions related to System One.  
For example, in one study, respondents chose between two alternatives:  a 
chocolate cake, “associated with more intense positive affect but less 
favorable cognitions,” versus a fruit salad, “associated with less favorable 
 
 184.  A classic example for such a need is that of Ulysses, who instructed his crew to tie 
him to the mast so that he could listen for himself but be restrained from submitting to the 
temptation to steer the ship closer.  HOMER, THE ODDYSSEY 275 (Robert Fagles trans., 1997). 
 185.  Food is a good illustration of the difficulty of resisting temptation: otherwise, 
obesity would not have occurred so frequently in the Western world.  Consider, for 
example, the following experiment: subjects were given free buckets of stale popcorn in a 
movie theatre.  Half the subjects received big buckets, while the other half received 
medium-sized buckets.  Recipients of the bigger bucket ate 53% more stale popcorn. See 
BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING: WHY WE EAT MORE THAN WE THINK 16-18 (2010) 
(showing the lack of will-power when presented with stale popcorn).  People tend to eat 
what is readily available rather than deliberate on the food’s merits.  For a general 
discussion of obesity and market manipulation, see Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David 
Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1647 (2004).  
   186.    Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 177, at 51. 
 187.  See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 177, at 51. 
   188.    Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 177, at 51 tbl. 2.1. 
   189.    Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 177, at 51 tbl. 2.1. 
 190.  Or, in order to fulfill our autonomous desires.  A key concept that requires 
deliberation here is that of autonomy.  Since both System 1 and System 2 decisions stem 
from the same subject, it is philosophically important to justify our preference for one over 
the other.  One way to define autonomy is as a relationship between individuals’ actions and 
their preferences, and between individuals’ preferences and their selves.  Essentially, 
autonomy is defined here as a consistency between one’s self (as accorded by her desired 
preferences) and one’s behavior.  Note that the underlying assumption here is that the set of 
preferences is separate from the “self.”  Essentially, this view defines autonomy as 
consistency between two layers of the “self,” the core self and a set of preferences that is 
presumably detached from that core.  This assumption was severely criticized as artificial 
and farfetched. See, e.g., Susan Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in 
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, 48-
50 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (discussing theoretical view of agency that utilize this 
assumption and proposing an alternative theoretical view of agency – “the deep self view”).  
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affect but more favorable cognitions.”
191
  Findings from such experiments 
suggest that if processing resources are limited, spontaneously evoked 
affective reactions, rather than cognitions, tend to have a greater impact on 
choice.
192
  As a result, the consumer is more likely to choose the alternative 
that is superior on the affective dimension, but inferior on the cognitive 
dimension (e.g., chocolate cake).
193
 
5. Status-quo Bias and Short-sightedness 
Making decisions is costly:  it is time consuming, and requires 
cognitive effort and deliberative energy.  Thus, most people tend either to 
stick with the current situation or to prefer their original choice over and 
over again.
194
  For some choices, such as a breakfast menu or running trail, 
sticking to the original choice makes sense.  For others though, inability to 
change and preference to the current may turn very costly.
195
  Because 
consumers lack the energy to change their decisions, sellers have incentives 
to create honey traps that are structured aggressively as great bargains for 
the short term and that require high opt out costs.
196
  Consumers’ preference 
for the status quo is related to their shortsightedness in evaluating the 
alternatives they are offered.  Thinking of the longer term costs of product 
maintenance requires complex calculation and cognitive effort.  Sellers 
have incentives to structure their product as a great bargain, offering a 
lower purchase-price to hide the high maintenance and usage costs.
197
  By 
the time consumers become aware of the actual cost of the product, the 
costs consumers incur to change their usage habits ultimately deter the 
 
 191.  Baba Shiv & Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of 
Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 288 (1999).  
   192.    Id. at 288. 
 193.  Id. at 278. 
 194.  This effect is commonly referred to as the “status quo bias.”  See, e.g., William 
Samuelson & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) (documenting empirically the “status quo bias”). 
 195.  A good illustration for the costs of inertia is failure to update the investment 
portfolio of pension plans throughout a career, so that the investments for the pension retain 
the default contribution rate and fund allocation.  Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The 
Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 
1149, 1184–86 (2001).  
 196.  This strategy is commonly used in many industries.  Credit cards offer a first year 
free of annual fees, magazines offer great bargains for the first few months, cell phones are 
offered as great bargains if consumers commit to stay as customers for 3 years, during 
which the seller has sole discretion to change the fees.  
   197.     See, e.g., Jim Rendon, Much More Than Just ‘Maintenance,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/realestate/getting-started-much-more-than-just-
maintenance.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the costs of condos in New York are often 
accompanied by high monthly maintenance fees). 
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consumer from changing products; as a result, the seller may reap higher 
prices.
198
  Legal intervention may be justified as a means to overcome this 
bias, inform consumers of the total costs of ownership, and of the temporal 
alteration options, as well as to set efficient defaults for complex product 
choices. 
C. Sustainability Reporting 
Recent trends in corporate governance reflect an abundance of 
corporate “sustainability” reporting – in addition to the established 
financial reports based on accounting standards – that focus on the 
corporation’s environmental and social impact.  A study by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCI) suggests that 499 of the 
500 corporations in the S&P 500 made sustainability disclosures in a 
financial filing, or linked financial performance to a sustainability 
initiative.
199
 This indicates that corporations may be willing to 
communicate voluntarily with investors on a variety of topics – including 
more than those required for disclosure in compliance with the federal 
securities laws. 
Sustainability reporting is significant because it creates a wider scope 
of information for investors that includes benchmarking and assessment of 
non-financial performance measured by a uniform format developed by the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
200
 and voluntarily adopted by many 
corporations.
201
  However, even close adherence to the GRI standards of 
disclosure would not promote consumers’ freedom of choice or the 
efficiency of the consumer products market.  Sustainability reporting is 
made for investors rather than consumers because it is not product-specific 
and does not compare the material information about products offered by 
 
 198.  This strategy is commonly used in software sales. Software is often sold at a 
bargain or given free with high costs for technical support and service, so that the total costs 
of ownership are much higher than the apparent purchase price.  See Raj Sabhlok, Open 
Source Software:  The Hidden Cost of Free, FORBES (July 18, 2013, 10:00am), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rajsabhlok/2013/07/18/open-source-software-the-hidden-cost-
of-free/ (noting that free open-source software may be cost-effective, but has “ongoing 
maintenance and support [costs] as well as the up-front development [costs]”). 
 199. PETER DESIMONE, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SUSTAINABLE 
INVESTMENTS INST., INTEGRATED FINANCIAL AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 5 (2013), available at http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL_Integrated_ 
Financial_Sustain_Reporting_April_2013.pdf. 
 200. Mission and Vision, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting 
.org/Pages /default.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
   201.    See, e.g.,  DESIMONE, supra  note 199, at 109 (noting that Southwest Airlines’ 10-K 
stated that the company “undertakes voluntary investigation or remediation of soil or 
groundwater contamination at several airport sites.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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material categories.
202
  Therefore, sustainability reporting’s materiality 
stops at the investor reporting level.  Sustainability reporting is a significant 
step in the development of corporations as good citizens, but has no impact 
on their role as sellers in real life. 
D. Third Parties’ Commercial Speech 
Product information cannot be sufficiently supplied by third party 
information providers, such as consumers’ unions, because of the nature of 
product information as a natural monopoly, which creates a free rider 
externality.
203
  Since information collected and generated by professional 
third parties can be disseminated at low marginal cost (i.e., a natural 
monopoly), and consumers can redistribute purchased information to other 
free rider consumers, economic theory predicts a professional third party is 
expected to produce less than efficient amounts of information, as its 
profits will not enable internalization of the real demand to its information 
processing service.
204
 
In reality, as in economic theory, third parties and consumer unions do 
not seem to sufficiently address the difficulty of informational darkness in 
the consumer products market.  The impartial product review published by 
Consumer Reports is a partial solution, but it only considers a limited 
number of categories of products and it compares only a few of the 
available brands for each product surveyed.
205
  While providing a 
significant service, third parties are not a thorough solution to the problems 
of product information. 
Third parties that provide information must bear the costs of the 
information search, verification, and analysis (and, occasionally, pricing).  
Regulation may be justified as a means to reduce these costs.  As these 
costs decrease, the number of third party agents and information traders is 
 
   202. See Jeff Civins & Mary Mendoza, Corporate Sustainability and Social 
Responsibility:  A Legal Perspective, 71 TEX. B.J. 368, 369 (2008) (noting that corporations’ 
sustainability programs typically include “strategic planning; corporate policy and goals and 
procedures to implement them; infrastructure; a code of conduct; standards, manuals, and 
guides; stakeholder communication, including dialogue and reporting; performance and 
appraisal metrics; and line responsibilities.”). 
 203.  See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 503 (discussing the costs of 
consumer protection regulation).  Consumers’ ignorance benefits sellers on average also due 
to the sub-optimal use of products by ignorant consumers); see also supra notes 114-116 
and accompanying text (discussing the how the free-rider problem leads to a dearth of 
information for consumers). 
   204.    Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 503. 
 205.  See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 31, at 504 (discussing a speech of third 
parties and Consumer Reports).  Business initiatives such as Kamaze and the like may be an 
exception to this rule.  
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expected to increase,
206
 and their contribution is expected to be more 
precise.
207
  The cost of obtaining product information is minimal for the 
corporation that creates it, but it is very expensive for the information 
trader who is an outsider seeking to uncover nonpublic information.  This is 
especially true with regard to complex products that often require extensive 
research in order to reveal their true nature and characteristics.  Without 
mandatory disclosure, information traders are bound to engage in duplicate 
efforts to reach the same information and uncover it only partially.  
Mandatory disclosure may be justified as a means to lower and subsidize 
these costs. 
Uniform disclosure duties can be justified as a means to improve and 
enhance the competition between information traders and third party 
information providers, and as a means to reduce the entry barriers to the 
market of information trading in the products market.  Requiring 
corporations to disclosure product information to their consumers can 
effectively subsidize search costs for consumers, facilitate a competitive 
market for information traders of product information, who may offer 
similar services to those offered by Consumer Reports, and enhance 
consumer market efficiency and consumers' freedom. 
III. CONSUMERS’ CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP 
A. Consumer Organizational Membership 
Corporations should be accountable to consumers for their products’ 
information because of the nature of their relationship with their 
consumers.  Most consumer contracts are constructed very similarly to 
organizations
208
:  consumers purchasing a cell phone, entering a health 
insurance program, signing up for a daily paper, or ordering cable 
television are each signing a form contract, but simultaneously subjecting 
themselves to the rules and procedures of the seller’s corporate 
organization.  It is a long and well-established truth that consumers do not 
really negotiate agreements with corporate providers.
209
 Instead, consumers 
 
 206.  Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 66, at 741–43. 
 207.  This argument is assuming that mandatory disclosure lowers the effect of noise 
traders and associated noise risk.  See id. at 738–39 (discussing the risk of estimating 
undiscoverable undisclosed information). 
 208.   Menachem Mautner, Judicial Intervention in the Contents of Contracts and the 
Question of the Future Development of Israeli Contract Law, 29 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 17, 
30-35, nn. 28, 38 (2005). 
 209.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts 
of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631–32 
(1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
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simply choose to enter into a contractual relationship governed completely 
by the terms of the corporate entity, and during the term of the contract, 
corporate providers often control all aspects of the relationship.
210
 
Corporations are for-profit organizations formed by their shareholders 
who seek to maximize earnings while isolating the risks through their 
limited liability status.  Scholars of Organizational Behavior often define an 
organization as a social system of collaboration that strives to maintain or 
achieve a common goal or objective.
211
  Since corporations constantly 
change their business activity and goals over time, it has been suggested 
that the organizational goal is simply one of continued survival and 
perpetuation.
212
  In general, organizations are distinct from other social 
entities.
213
 First, organizations are formally recognized by a governmental 
agency.
214
  Often the organization is created by official documents, such as 
charters, articles of association, bylaws or statutes that are filed with the 
state’s bureaucracies.
215
  Second, organizations are distinct in their 
boundaries.
216
 Members of the organization may choose to enter an 
organization, and may choose to exit it.
217
  While contracted with it, 
though, they are subject to its rules and regulations, as well as to its culture 
and ethics base.
218
  Boundaries are a key element of organizational culture, 
and often significant resources are devoted to their maintenance and 
 
REV. 1174, 1224–25 (1983).  
   210.     See Rakoff, supra note 209, at 1224 (noting that firms “do not want to negotiate 
individualized contracts because doing so entails bearing not only the costs of the particular 
negotiations, but also the economic and institutional costs of modifying an organizational 
structure geared to the standardized terms.”). 
 211.   However, the goal pursuit definition is incomplete as many members of the 
organization do not share the ultimate goal that the organization was formed to achieve.  
Corporations are typically formed for profit maximization, but many of their stakeholder 
members, including consumers and employees, do not share that original goal and are not 
committed to it.  JERALD GREENBERG, MANAGING BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 9 (2010); 
JEFFREY PFEFFER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
7 (1997) [hereinafter PFEFFER, NEW DIRECTIONS]; JEFFREY PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS AND 
ORGANIZATION THEORY 125-26 (1982) [hereinafter PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS]; W. RICHARD 
SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 23-24 (1992).  
 212.   See Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS supra note 211, at 7.  
 213.   Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 7. 
   214.     Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 7. 
   215.   See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (“Any . . . corporation . . . may 
incorporate . . . under this chapter by filing with the Division of Corporations in the 
Department of State a certificate of incorporation. . .  .”). 
   216.     Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 9. 
   217.      See Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 9 (stating that “maintenance and 
demarcation” of boundaries are important in organizations). 
   218.  See Pfeffer, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 211, at 9 (noting that, while 
“organizational boundaries are clearly permeable . . . permeability is to some degree under 
the control of the organization.”). 
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demarcation, as membership with the organization is an indicator of class 
and social status. 
The typical nature of the corporate relationship with its consumers 
resembles corporate organizational membership more than it does a 
contract, and this suggests that corporate law is the more appropriate legal 
platform for protecting consumer rights.  Mautner suggests that consumer 
contracts resemble organizations in three key manners
219
:  first, as members 
of a corporation, consumers choose to enter into their relationships with the 
seller; second, as members of a corporation, consumers choose to exit their 
relationships with the seller when they end the consumer contract;
220
 and 
third, as members of a corporation, consumers are not able to negotiate the 
terms of engagement with the seller, but rather subject themselves during 
the contract period to the seller’s complex web of rules and regulations of 
social control.
221
 
Consumers are often subjected to corporate rules and regulations 
during the term of their contract.  Consider, for example, a parent’s contract 
with his or her daughter's preschool.  While the parent opts into the 
agreement voluntarily, once contracted, the entire relationship is set 
through the preschool’s management, which often sets careful procedures 
to manage the content and form of the daughter’s daily life and to manage 
the parent’s ability to opt out and end the relationship.  Most technological 
products set similar boundaries for their consumers, who can choose to 
purchase and use the product as pre-programmed by the corporate provider, 
but are not allowed to amend any of its features. Even a standard contract 
with a health insurer is typically so overloaded with information and 
includes so many fine-print details that the outcome is the same:  the 
consumer can choose either to purchase or not to purchase the coverage 
offered, but its terms are unilaterally set by the corporate insurer in its sole 
discretion and may include any number of exclusions.
222
 
While contracts are conceived of as arrangements supposedly 
 
 219.  Mautner, supra note 208, at 30-35, nn. 28, 38. 
 220.  Mautner, supra note 208, at 30-35 nn.28, 38. Interestingly, commentators note that 
corporations often impose a capital lock in provision on their investors. Margaret M. Blair, 
Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the 
Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV., 387, 388-89 (2003). Lynn A. Stout argues that the 
nature of the corporation can be better understood by focusing on its capacity to lock in 
equity investors’ initial capital contributions by making it far more difficult for those 
investors to subsequently withdraw assets from the firm.  A corporation is much easier for 
equity investors to get into than to get out of. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of 
Corporations, U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 253-67 (2005).  
   221.     Mautner, supra note 208, at 30-35 nn.28, 38. 
   222.   See, e.g., Cigna Healthcare Policies, CIGNA, available at http://www.cigna.com 
/cigna-healthcare-policies (last visited, Dec. 9, 2014) (providing an extensive list of policies, 
each with its own paragraph description). 
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mutually agreed to by all parties, organizations have preconceived 
constructs that are typically prefixed at the moment of a particular agent’s 
entry and are harder for the member to change or affect otherwise.
223
  The 
rules and culture of the organization are a means to achieve social control 
and coordination between its members.  Given that consumers are rarely 
negotiating parties in control of the details of their arrangement with the 
seller, their relationship with sellers resembles organizational membership 
more than it resembles classical contracts:  by purchasing the product, 
consumers choose to consume the product under a detailed set of terms and 
conditions prefixed by the corporate seller.  At the moment of purchase, the 
consumer does not mutually agree to the terms of the consumer contract, 
but rather subjects herself to the corporate seller’s organizational culture, 
rules, and procedures in providing the service or product hoped for. 
B. Stakeholder Theory 
Corporate accountability towards consumers is based on the premise 
that corporations are established to create social value rather than merely 
profit for shareholders.
224
  Although the conventional analysis of corporate 
law is focused on reducing agency costs created from the divergence 
between management, owners, and controlling and non-controlling owners, 
stakeholder theory refuses to see shareholders as the ultimate beneficiaries 
of corporate law, but instead sees them as owners of a residual interest in 
its profits.
225
  A stakeholder approach to business defines the corporate 
purpose as creating as much value as possible for all stakeholders,
226
 
classically defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the organization's objectives.”
227
  Under the 
 
 223.  Mautner, supra note 208, at 30-35, nn. 28, 38.  
 224.  Charles Handy, What’s a Business For?, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 49, 51-52 (2002). 
 225.  See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 260 (explaining how some economists 
define the firm as a bundle of assets under common ownership where control is delineated 
ex ante to hired inputs by explicit contracts, while the owners retain residual control and 
profits). 
 226.  One recurring theme in stakeholder theory literature is the definition of a 
stakeholder.  The Stanford Research Institute (SRI) refers to the group without whose 
support the organization would cease to exist (including shareowners, employees, 
customers, suppliers, lenders and society).  See R. F. Stewart, J.K. Allen & J.M. Cavender, 
The Strategic Plan, Research Report 168, Stanford Research Institute, Long Range Planning 
Service, Industrial Economics Division (1963).  Slinger holds that the term refers to all 
those who have a “stake” in the corporate enterprise and contribute to the success of its 
business.  See G. Slinger, Essays on Stakeholding (1999) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Cambridge), quoted in R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF 
THE ART 47 (2010).  
 227.  FREEMAN, supra note 16, at 46; R. EDWARD FREEMAN & JOHN MCVEA, A 
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stakeholder mindset, business is seen as a set of relationships between 
groups that have a stake in the activities of the organization.  Accordingly, 
the stakeholder approach evaluates a corporate seller based on more than 
just profit maximization to its shareholders; rather, it is evaluated based on 
how consumers, suppliers, employees, financers (including bondholders 
and banks), communities, and shareholders interact to create integral value 
together.
228
  The role of management is to shape and manage these 
relationships and to balance divergent interests for the firm's benefit.
229
  
Two famous diagrams demonstrate the juggling of management between 
different stakeholder constituencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 189 (Michael A. Hitt et al. eds, 
2001).  
   228.    See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 16, at 68 (noting that stakeholder analysts 
focus on “all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise” 
(emphasis original)).  
   229.     Donaldson & Preston, supra note 16, at 79. 
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Blair and Stout view a corporation as a team of participants who 
enter into a complex agreement to work together for mutual gain.
230
 The 
corporation is a coalition of members seeking a premium on its opportunity 
costs through collaboration with the team.
231
  Corporate law is the default 
set of rules for such cooperation, reducing transaction costs for ad hoc 
contracting between various members.
232
  Stakeholder members of the 
corporation are thus yielding power over key outputs and inputs to the 
shared body of cooperation, delegating authority for dispute resolution and 
for allocation of assets and liabilities to a board of directors acting as 
trustees of different stakeholders, and aiming to maintain a productive and 
efficient coalition despite diverging interests between the various groups.
233
  
Blair and Stout support their view with the language and procedures of 
corporate law, under which the board of directors owes a fiduciary duty to 
the firm, a fictional personality, rather than to the shareholders.
234
  Under 
U.S. case law, directors are generally subject to liability only for conduct 
that harms not only the shareholders but other stakeholders as well.
235
  
Since U.S. based public corporations typically have no controlling 
shareholder, but rather are owned by dispersed shareholders, many boards 
of U.S. public corporations are independent; thus, Blair and Stout limit 
 
 230.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 285-87 (noting how the mediating hierarchy 
model suggests that shareholders of public companies give up control in hopes of sharing in 
the benefits that can come from team production). 
   231.   Id. at 285. 
   232.   Id. at 289 n.90. 
   233.   Id. at 285. 
   234.   Id. at 298. 
   235.   Id. at 299. 
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their argument to public corporations, while private corporations may 
adhere to the principal-agent conventional analysis of corporate law.
236
 
Stakeholder accountability theory is rooted in ideas about corporate 
social responsibility that emerged in Europe in the inter-war period (1918-
1939) when few large stock corporations dominated the economies of the 
west.  The rise of managerial agents as prominent organs of the 
corporation, whose owners are passive and widely dispersed, raised the 
question of managerial agents’ accountability.  In a series of public 
correspondences between Adolf Berle and American corporate lawyer E. 
Merrick Dodd published in the early 1930s, Berle argued that the fiduciary 
duties of managers should be enhanced to prevent the preference of 
controlling groups of shareholders over minority groups.
237
  Dodd 
suggested that once the corporation is an independent entity separate from 
its owners, rather than an aggregate of stockholders, “[t]hose through 
whom [a corporation] acts may therefore employ its funds in a manner 
appropriate to a person practising a profession and imbued with a sense of 
social responsibility without thereby being guilty of a breach of trust[,]” 
suggesting a view of the corporation not as a purely private enterprise but 
as a wider organization with social responsibilities and obligations.
238
  By 
the 1950s, shareholder primacy was seen as “slightly old fashioned,”
239
 and 
managers were conceived of as in charge of balancing the interests of 
different groups connected with the “soulful,” socially responsible 
corporation.
240
  In the 1960s, corporate managers were described as 
“administrators of a community system,” explicitly rejecting shareholder 
primacy.
241
  Shareholder primacy returned to dominance with the rise of 
neoliberal ideology in the financial markets of the 1980s and 1990s. 
242
 
 
 236.  Id. at 281.  
 237.  Adolf Berle, Note, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365 (1932).  
 238.  E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV 
1145, 1161 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Is the Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties 
of Corporate Managers Predictable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 194-207 (1935).  
 239.  L.C.B. Gower, Shareholder Democracy: A Broader Outlook for Corporations, 68 
HARV. L. REV. 922, 927 (1955) (book review). 
 240.  Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. 
REV. 311, 313-14 (1957). 
 241.  BRYAN HORRIGAN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
DEBATES, MODELS AND PRACTICES ACROSS GOVERNMENT, LAW AND BUSINESS 89 (2010) 
(citing Adolf A. Berle, The Corporation in a Democratic Society, in MANAGEMENT AND 
CORPORATIONS 1985 63, 68 (M. Anshen and G. Bach eds., 1975));  cf. Wilber G. Katz, 
Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J.L. & ECON. 75, 82 (1960) (countering that 
the “only statutes and cases which suggest any departure from [shareholder primacy] are 
those relating to gifts [that] provide no basis for Professor Berle’s general assertion that 
[directors are] . . . ‘administrators of a community system.’”). 
    242.  Paddy Ireland & Renginee G. Pillay, Corporate Social Responsibility in a 
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Fiercely believing in the forces of the market as efficient and as the primary 
facilitator of wealth, neoliberals acted toward the goal of deregulation in 
order to free the forces of the free market from governmental 
intervention.
243
  Shareholders in this period were less dispersed and were 
represented by few institutional investors, and claims for shareholder 
activism and shareholder value got stronger.
244
 
While shareholders of large corporations in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century were often personally involved in managing or 
monitoring the corporation, at the beginning of the twentieth century 
owners of corporations’ stocks became typically uninvolved in 
management or production, assuming a passive role and becoming widely 
dispersed, taking little interest in the daily management of the business.
245
  
In the twenty-first century, corporations are not only owned by dispersed 
owners, but also have a larger global impact than governments, with 
consumer communities dispersed between various nations and lands.  
Nothing in the contractual relationship between consumers and sellers 
resembles the nineteenth century negotiation of a consumer with a small 
merchant at the town marketplace.  The seller is now not owned by an 
individual, and the buyer is not asking any questions or making any 
requests.  But the law for provision of consumer product information 
remains the same.  The radical reconceptualization of the corporation as a 
public institution, which suggests that directors owe duties to employees, 
consumers, creditors, and society as a whole, as well as to shareholders, 
may not be so radical when considering this historical change.
246
 
One significant hurdle that stakeholder theory needs to overcome 
to become legally applicable is providing a concrete methodology for 
balancing competing stakeholder interests.  The business judgment rule 
protects board decisions from judicial second-guessing when acting in good 
faith, with due care, and in a manner it reasonably believes is in the 
company’s best interests.
247
  However, protecting consumers’ informational 
interests may inherently conflict with shareholder value.  A 2010 Delaware 
Chancery Court decision in Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark 
suggests board accountability standards in for-profit corporations include 
 
Neoliberal Age, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATORY GOVERNANCE: 
TOWARDS INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT? 78 (Peter Utting & Jose Carlos Marques eds., 2010). 
   243.    Ireland & Pillay, supra note 242, at 85. 
 244.  DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM 286-91 (1997).  
 245.  Ireland & Pillay, supra note 242, at 77, 80.  
 246.  Ireland & Pillay, supra note 242, at 77, 80. 
 247.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). Boards may not 
pursue corporate policies that are untethered from the corporation’s business interests—
revenues, profit, equity value and related matters concerning relationships with customers, 
suppliers, employees and other stakeholders.  See id. (noting that board decisions will not be 
interfered with as long as they can be attributed to any rational business purpose). 
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acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders, which, in that case, involved striking down a “poison pill” 
designed by the board to preserve organizational culture.
248
  Indeed, the 
concept of a for-profit corporation implies a deeper accountability to 
shareholder value. 
Viewing the corporation as a nexus of contracts implies a need for 
an evaluation model for stakeholder interests and their strength.  In 
perfectly efficient markets, both principals and agents are able to enter and 
exit organizational contracts at will if we assume an infinite number of 
contractual alternatives.
249
 But in our imperfectly efficient reality, often 
agents are not able to enter and exit freely their contractual 
commitments.
250
  This results in power differentials between agents due to 
unequal corporate dependence between the parties.
251
  In balancing 
between conflicting interests of stakeholders, board members may assess 
the flexibility of the corporate organizational boundaries.
252
 In efficient 
markets, easy entry into the organizational relationship and smooth exit 
from it seem to require a lesser degree of corporate accountability. Entry 
and exit barriers that make the market inefficient, however, seem to call for 
accountability towards the relevant group of stakeholders.
253
  Interestingly, 
under this power differential model shareholders in publicly traded 
corporations are actually the least in need of regulatory protection because 
they can easily exit their relationship with the corporation by selling their 
stock.  In contrast, corporate accountability to consumers, should be 
required to be higher than corporate accountability to investors, as 
consumers are often bound by form contracts that have lock-in periods or 
other high exit barriers.
254
 
Stakeholder theory implies accountability only towards contractual 
parties to the corporation.
255
  It is thus significant to note its distinction 
from corporate social responsibility, which calls for enhancement of 
corporate accountability towards external parties that are foreign to the 
 
 248.  16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that in this case preserving corporate culture is 
in directors’ self-interest). 
   249.    Charles W. Hill & Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 29 J. OF MGMT. 
STUD. 131, 135 (1992)  
   250.    Hill & Jones, supra note 249, at 135. 
   251.    Hill & Jones, supra note 249, at 135. 
   252.     See Hill & Jones, supra note 249, at 146-47 (suggesting ways for corporate boards 
to reduce the concentration of stakeholder power). 
 253.  See Hill & Jones, supra note 249, at 134-35 (noting that power differentials created 
by inefficient markets “materially affect both the content of principal-agent contracts and 
the structure of governance mechanisms policing those contracts.”). 
 254.  See discussion of exit barriers, supra Part I.E.   
   255.    See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 16, at 68 (stating that stakeholder theory is 
concerned with those who are involved in the enterprise). 
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corporation’s business.
256
  Like the Once-ler in “The Lorax” who 
rationalizes his corporation’s destruction of the environment by stating 
“How ba-a-a-ad can I be? . . . a portion of proceeds goes to charity,”
257
 
corporate social responsibility provides corporations with a narrative of 
societal consciousness that allows them to rationalize  harmful corporate 
behavior.  Indeed, under this trend, corporations fail to return their debts to 
creditors on the one hand, while giving charity donations on the other.  
Corporate social responsibility allows tax deductions for the—often 
minor— expense and provides great public relations value.  “All the 
customers are buying,” tells us the Once-ler, representing the evil in 
capitalism, “and the PR people are lying.”
258
 
Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, is a methodology of 
corporate accountability towards specific groups deeply involved with the 
corporation and its activity, including its investors as well as its employees, 
suppliers, and consumers.
259
  Stakeholder theory rejects a soft law approach 
and calls for specific normative implications.  Typically, the corporate 
moral hazard takes the form of a set of voluntary standards imposed by 
corporations as an ethical code of principles published by the management 
and self regulated by the corporation in question.
260
  Integrating social and 
environmental concerns in corporate business operations on a voluntary 
basis creates limited incentives for legal compliance and thereby often 
remains a tool of marketing with limited effect on actual performance.
261
  
For example, the Christian Aid Report, Behind the Mask: The Real Face of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, lists a string of transgressions by 
international business lobbies that “vigorously oppose” their corporate 
 
    256.   See Alexandra R. Harrington, Corporate Social Responsibility, Globalization, The 
Multinational Corporation, and Labor:  An Unlikely Alliance, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 483, 489-90 
(2012) (discussing how corporate social responsibility entails responsibility to a broad range 
of subjects). 
 257.  DR. SEUSS’ THE LORAX (Universal Pictures 2012). 
 258.  Id. 
   259.   See Donaldson & Preston, supra note 16, at 68 (noting that stakeholder analysts 
focus on “all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise” 
(emphasis original)). 
 260.  See, e.g., Code of Business Conduct, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, (April 2009), 
available at http://assets.coca-colacompany.com/45/59/f85d53a84ec597f74c754003450c/ 
COBC_English.pdf (providing Coca-Cola’s official code of business that includes topics 
such as: acting with integrity around the globe, integrity in the company, integrity in dealing 
with others); see also Colin Crouch, Modeling the Firm in its Market and Organizational 
Environment: Methodologies for Studying Corporate Social Responsibility, 27 ORG. STUD. 
1533, 1542 (2006)(arguing that corporations have an incentive to manipulate stakeholder 
theory and corporate social responsibility to achieve their own ends).  
 261.  See Ireland & Pillay, supra note 242 at 94 (“CSR is often treated by corporations as 
little more than a public relations or window dressing exercise”).  
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social responsibility commitments,
262
 including:  Shell Corporation, who 
officially strives to be a good neighbor but “fails to quickly clean up oil 
spills that ruin villages”; British American Tobacco, who stresses its 
commitment to high standards of health and safety but is reported to have 
“chronic ill-health related to tobacco cultivation”; and Coca-Cola, who 
states that it uses “natural resources responsibly” but is claimed to have “a 
wholly owned subsidiary in India [being] accused of depleting village wells 
in an area where water is notoriously scarce.”
263
 
The challenge of making corporations accountable to their 
stakeholders is wrapped up in the issue of how to make accountability 
meaningful, measurable, and enforceable, bringing the value of free choice 
back to the consumer shopping experience.  In Individual and Corporate 
Social Responsibility,
264
 Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole discuss three 
alternative visions of corporate social responsibility.  Vision 1 is the “win-
win” approach, under which the incentive for corporate social 
responsibility stems naturally and inherently from the promotion of 
shareholders’ interests in profits.
265
  When firms fail to accommodate 
corporate social responsibility, they in fact reduce shareholder value by 
focusing on the short term.
266
  For example, Bénabou and Tirole bring up a 
firm that may reduce costs by reneging on a contract with its labor or 
suppliers so as to reduce costs, thereby damaging the long-term goodwill of 
the different constituencies, making it more difficult to attract motivated 
employees in the future, or induce suppliers to make long-term 
investments.
267
  Corporate social responsibility under this first vision is in 
fact a means by which a corporation can maximize profits and enhance 
shareholder value in the long run.
268
 
Bénabou and Tirole label Vision 2 “delegated philanthropy.”
269
  
Under this view, a firm is a channel for expression of different 
constituencies, and the corporation’s management caters to demand by 
supplying the stakeholders’ need in charity while maximizing profit.
270
  As 
Bénabou and Tirole point out, one needs to explain why the corporation is 
 
 262.  CHRISTIAN AID, BEHIND THE MASK: THE REAL FACE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, 20 (2007), available at http://baierle.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/behind-
mask.pdf. 
 263.  Id. at 2. 
 264.  Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 
ECONOMICA 1 (2010).  
 265.  Id. at 9. 
   266.    Id. at 10. 
 267.  Id. at 9-10. 
   268.    Id. at 10. 
 269.  Id. at 10. 
 270.  Id. at 11. 
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the adequate social vehicle for this philanthropy.
271
 As an alternative, for 
example, Starbucks’ consumers could send the workers in a coffee 
plantation some donations through a charitable organization.
272
  The 
explanation Bénabou and Tirole suggest is transaction cost savings.
273
  
Since the corporation is already involved in the transaction with the 
workers, it will be much cheaper for it to forward them the donation.
274
  
Vision 3 is labeled by Bénabou and Tirole as “insider-initiated corporate 
philanthropy,” and it reflects management’s personal need or willingness to 
contribute money to a good cause, using “others’ money” for that 
purpose.
275
 
This article advocates for corporate accountability to product 
information by considering the corporation in its role as a provider of 
products or services to the public.  Rather than a platform of delegated 
philanthropy, or a means to enhance value for shareholders or managers, 
the corporation is a legal institution that is granted legal privileges of 
incorporation with limited liability, and against such privileges it should 
incur accountability towards its consumers and not solely towards its 
investors.  If corporations are to be considered social institutions of 
importance, and not simply assets of their owners, and if managers are to 
be seen as more than agents of the shareholders, corporate governance must 
be used as a mechanism for enhancing the voice of stakeholders and 
 
 271.  Id. at 13.  
 272.  Id. at 10. 
   273.   Id. 
 274. Obviously, there is some circularity in this answer. There is no doubt that the 
corporation can deal with the workers more efficiently and for less transaction costs, but the 
real question is why do we use the corporate vehicle as a social means for charity to begin 
with. Why do we find the corporate relationship we have with other stakeholder 
constituencies to raise a justification for charity to begin with? In theory, if consumer 
citizens are bothered by work conditions in Africa, they can collect and send money to the 
group in need even if not directly in a relationship with them (one can assume workers for 
Dunkin Donuts coffee enjoy no better terms of employment, and from a human rights 
standpoint, there is no justification for why we should support only the workers working 
directly on our personal cup of latte). The apparent answer is that we find a need to support 
those in relationship to our actual lives, even if indirectly and through the channel of a for-
profit organization.  
 275.  Id. at 11. This vision is easily objectionable on corporate governance grounds. See 
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 122. Recently, following the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), much 
academic ado is credited to the issue of political donations conducted by corporations, 
giving rise to questions of agency costs and management’s personal political agendas 
promoted at the shareholders’ expense..  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., 
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides? 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 87-89 (2010) (noting that 
corporate political spending is treated similar to ordinary business decisions and is delegated 
to management). 
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mitigating conflicts of interests between various groups that arise within 
the corporate structure.  In particular, corporate governance should impose 
a standard of corporate accountability to product information that would 
initiate adequate disclosure to consumers based on the power differential 
test suggested above. 
Not all consumers should be treated alike, however.  Applying the 
power differential test for corporate informational accountability implies an 
organizational assessment of corporate boundaries and consumers’ exit 
barriers from the relationship with the corporate seller.
276
  Exit barriers may 
be contractual, as in cellular packages or utilities contracts, or natural, as in 
preschool enrollment.  Exit barriers are also highly correlated with product 
risk:  the higher the product's risk, the higher the probability the consumer 
would be affected by its consumption for a long term.  Consumption that 
entails a long-term relationship with the seller should be accompanied by 
higher informational accountability provided to consumers. 
IV. MEDIATING HIERARCHY APPLIED: CORPORATE 
INFORMATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS CONSUMERS 
Having established that consumers are legitimate corporate 
members in need of better product information, this article proceeds to 
sketch normative foundations for such corporate disclosure.  Current 
informational accountability under contract law applies freedom of 
commercial speech, accompanied by liability imposed ex post by courts in 
cases of fraud and misrepresentation.  This ex post liability is insufficient.  
This part of the article sketches a proposal for accountability standards that 
match the challenge of corporations offering products or services to the 
public. 
A. Doctrinal Foundations:  Comparing Corporate Law and Consumer 
Contracts 
Under current law, the relationship between consumers and 
corporate sellers is categorized as contractual.
277
  Like small merchants in 
the archaic marketplace, multinational corporations offering the public 
services or products may design their commercial speech according to their 
commercial interests, providing information only to the extent where 
contract law would render the agreement involuntary. 
 
 276.  See Charles W. Hill and Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 29 J.  
MGMT. STUD. 131, 134 (1992). 
   277.    See supra Part I.F. 
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There are several reasons why this contractual categorization is 
problematic:  as discussed above in Parts I and II, the legal preference 
toward investors is not justified by the factual characteristics of consumers 
versus investors as a group, and freedom of commercial speech results in 
an information environment that does not do enough to support freedom of 
consumer choice.  Contract law’s basic assumption is that horizontal 
scheme exists between contracting parties that are in a mutual relationship, 
however, the consumer-seller relationship is anything but mutual.
278
 
Consumers are dispersed and the contractual categorization separates them 
into separate individual relationships, despite the unified legal platform 
used by corporations through form contracts.
279
  The institution for dispute 
resolution in contractual relationships is the court, accompanied by ex post 
resolutions coming at a high expense, which makes only class actions 
plausible. 
In considering the appropriate legal paradigm to set informational 
accountability standards of corporations to consumers, it is useful to 
consider the major differences between the legal disciplines of contract law 
and corporate law.  While both laws set rules for private parties acting in a 
free market, they create distinct legal arrangements. 
Under a corporate law regime, accountability brings about 
settlement of the dispute at an earlier time because discussion of adequate 
product disclosures is conducted prior to the sale, taking into account the 
interests of consumers and their rights for informed choice.  Rather than 
waiting for consumers to sue based on the contract law claims of fraud or 
misrepresentation, and apply the precedents ex post, corporate law offers an 
ex ante policy to be adapted by the board of directors, an institution 
balancing the need and interests of consumers with other stakeholder 
groups, within the organization and given its specific circumstances. 
While claims of fraud and misrepresentation under contract law are 
standards interpreted by the court after the sale, corporate policy for 
product disclosures set by the board of directors resembles rules:  it is 
specific and accurate, and its normative content is given prior to the sale of 
the underlying product.  Setting a product information policy by the board 
of directors in advance may be preferable and more efficient.  The board of 
 
     278.    See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 1.1 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999) (noting that courts “generally continue[] to 
stress the classic concept of contract requiring two or more parties with capacity, 
consideration, mutual assent, and a lawful subject matter,” but observing that this “classic 
concept of contract” is “generally inapplicable to formal contracts or contracts under seal.”). 
    279.     For all practical purposes, these form contracts may be considered contracts of 
adhesion. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 159 (4th Pocket ed. 2009) (defining adhesion 
contract as “ a standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by another party 
in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about 
the terms.”). 
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directors is an internal institutional organ possessing a broad view of the 
business performance of the corporation on the one hand, and possessing 
vast data on the product or service, on the other hand.  The board of 
directors has much cheaper access to information about the various 
features, characteristics, and risks posed by products, as well as information 
about other stakeholders’ interests and considerations regarding such 
potential disclosures.  No court of law would ever be able to delve into 
these specific considerations as effectively as the board of directors.  The 
variety of products sold by most corporations also suggests that the proper 
institution to address issues of product information should be the board of 
directors rather than the court, which is not suitable for frequent similar 
decisions.
280
  Letting the board of directors fulfill its role as a mediating 
hierarchy allows better communication based on a common language 
shared between various stakeholder groups, leading to higher certainty 
about the rights and duties of each of the stakeholder groups and better 
organizational cooperation.
281
 
Typically, boards are considered to be accountable to the company, 
to the shareholders, or to both.
282
  Recent trends in international corporate 
governance, however, suggest dilution of the shareholder primacy norm, 
making way for other stakeholder concerns.  For example, the U.K., once 
an established kingdom of the shareholder primacy norm, enacted new 
regulations in 2013 under its 2006 Companies Act that require corporations 
to include annual reviews about key performance indicators of their 
business, including with regard to employment and environmental 
matters.
283
  In 2013, India enacted a new corporate law that mandates that 
public corporations establish a stakeholder relationship committee on the 
board, requiring independent board members to “safeguard the interests of 
all stakeholders.”
284
 The Canadian Supreme Court has ruled that board 
members owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation rather than its 
 
 280.  See Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 502, 510 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., Edward Elgar 
2000) (expounding that rules are preferable as a normative methodology when frequent 
policy decisions are required). 
 281.  This argument resembles Schauer’s argument for rules over standards, due to the 
function of rules as a semantic means of communication between the rule maker and the 
public. See Frederick Schauer, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 53-64(1992)(explaining that the role of 
rules is to communicate expected behavior to the intended audience).  
   282.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 19, at 298 (discussing the fiduciary duties of 
directors). 
 283.  The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 
2013, 2013, S.I. 2013/1970 (U.K.), available at  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1970/pdfs/uksi_20131970_en.pdf. 
 284.  The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India), available at 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf. 
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shareholders, in order to balance the interests of different constituencies.
285
  
Chinese corporate law requires corporations to “observe social morals” and 
to “assume social responsibility.”
286
 The prerogative of shareholders 
remains to appoint members of the boards of directors
287
—occasionally 
given limitations on professional qualifications (as in the case of 
independent directors).  But the accountability of the board of directors 
should be extended towards additional stakeholders.  Fiduciary duties of 
board members encompass the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and the 
obligation of good faith.
288
  Product information disclosure in the suggested 
corporate pattern may be rooted in the duty of care and in the obligation of 
good faith towards consumers as corporate stakeholders. 
Timing is also of essence, and the board of directors is expected to 
establish product information policy in advance, ex ante to the moment of 
purchase, whereas the use of contract law postpones the time of dispute 
resolution for ex post court discussions. 
The following is a table summarizing the main differences between 
contract law and corporate law, demonstrating why corporate law is more 
suitable for imposing product information accountability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 285.  BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 618 (Can.).  
 286.  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (全国人民代表大会常务委员会) 
[Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384124.htm. 
    287.   See Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
605, 609 (2007) (identifying voting to elect directors as one of the rights of shareholders). 
 288.  See Leo E. Strine Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good 
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 631 (2010) (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) to introduce and explain the duty of good faith, related 
to the traditional duties of loyalty and care, owed by directors).  
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A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF CONTRACT AND CORPORATE LAW 
 Contract Law Corporate Law 
Schematic 
Description of 
Relationship 
Between Parties   
Horizontal  
 
 
Vertical  
 
 
 
Consumer 
Dispersion  
Dispersed consumers, 
separated by numerous 
individual form 
contracts 
Uniform relationship 
with consumers, on 
a single legal 
platform 
Ethical foundation  Mutual assent and 
freedom of will  
Stakeholder theory 
and consumer 
corporate 
membership  
Institution for 
dispute resolution  
Court of law  Board of Directors  
Timing of Dispute 
resolution  
Ex post  Ex ante  
Liability 
foundations 
Fraud/misrepresentation Adequate and 
reasonable 
disclosure  
Remedy standard Damages, rescission 
and/or restitution 
Damages under 
private enforcement 
or public 
enforcement as 
applied in securities 
laws and regulations  
Organizational 
allocation of 
responsibility for 
product disclosures   
Management and 
Marketing staff  
Board of Directors  
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B. Essentials of Suggested Product Disclosure 
To redefine the informational relationship between corporate 
sellers and consumers, a profound amendment of disclosure practices is 
required.  Avoiding fraud and misrepresentation is not enough.  Product 
information that is disclosed should become accessible, accurate, 
comprehensive, and timely, and should allow consumers to fairly compare 
material product features to those of competing products available on the 
market.  Under these guidelines, corporate sellers that offer or distribute 
products and services to the public should be the individuals to disclose the 
product information.  Corporate law should be extended to include 
mandatory disclosure duties of product information following the essentials 
of materiality, accessibility and concise information.  Disclosing the 
information is not enough; corporations should ensure that information is 
given concisely and includes all material aspects required for a reasonable 
consumer to make her decision.   Below, some guidelines are suggested for 
product information policy, considering legibility of information disclosed 
by the corporation, load of information available regarding the product, 
lock-in provisions, the ease of exit from the consumer contract, and the 
long-term costs of the purchase. 
 Further analysis is required to determine how to create incentives 
for corporations to comply. Such research should compare patterns of 
private enforcement tools, such as those available to investors securing 
accurate filings and statements under the federal securities laws, and public 
enforcement by a governmental agency in charge of product information 
management similar to the SEC.  Public enforcement may have the 
advantage of setting a uniform scale and ranking system that would allow 
easy comparison of products offered, as well as enforcing consistent 
methodology of disclosure and location of information display.  
Consumers, or the public agency on their behalf, should be able to sue a 
corporation for inadequate product disclosure under corporate law even 
when there is no contractual claim for fraud or misrepresentation, if the 
disclosure provided for a particular product or service was not adequate 
given the product qualification. 
Based on the analysis of failures in current product information 
markets given in Part II above, I provide three essentials for product 
information disclosure below. Corporations selling products to the public 
should be accountable for product information disclosure, including all 
material information accessible and to the consumers’ public, in addition to 
their liability currently holding under contract law for fraud and 
misrepresentation. 
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(1) Materiality 
Product information disclosed must include all significant 
information for consumers’ usage.  Information disclosed 
should be comprehensive and timely.  A range of 
methodologies may be used to determine the significance of 
features and data for the materiality test.  One possible 
approach is adopting GRI standards
289
 for materiality as 
applied for consumers, taking into account the reasonable 
estimates of impact on consumers’ product use and the 
products' impact on the consumer's life. Materiality should 
include long-term costs of purchase and any lock-in periods 
imposed on consumers. 
(2) Accessibility 
Product information must be disclosed in an accessible manner 
on the front of the product’s package and in any other 
prominent source of commercial speech given on behalf of the 
corporation, in plain English and with no cost, allowing 
potential consumers to evaluate their purchase prior to 
payment. Corporations should consider the legibility of product 
information in assessment of its accessibility.  Information 
disclosed should be legible to the least sophisticated consumer 
of the product, and accessible to all consumers and potential 
consumers with no costs. 
(3) Conciseness 
Due to information overload environments, product 
information disclosed should be succinct and sharp.  Vague 
statements and masses of information provided in intense 
commercial speech environments should not be considered 
adequate disclosure. Product disclosure should be succinct and 
concise, simple and easy to understand.  Simplicity and visual 
clarity should convey all material information that reasonable 
consumers need. 
CONCLUSION 
This article makes the case for the inclusion of consumers as 
legitimate corporate stakeholders entitled to product informational rights.  
Comparing consumers to investors shows that they have more in common 
than the law recognizes.  Consumers need at least as much informational 
assistance as investors do, as shown by a comparison of the consumer 
 
 289.  Global Reporting Initiative, supra note 200.  
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choice process and the investment allocation process, the scope of risks, the 
complexity of choice and its structural market settings, such as 
intermediaries and regulation.  This article analyzes voluntary commercial 
speech environments and comes to the conclusion that the current market 
for product information fails to provide consumers a meaningful 
framework for efficient consumer choice.  When consumers are considered 
corporate members under an organizational analysis of stakeholder theory, 
corporations will be considered accountable to product disclosure.  Under 
the suggested doctrinal outcome, corporate law would impose mandatory 
disclosure duties of product information, applied to corporations that offer 
services and products to the public.  Consumers would be entitled to 
reasonable and accessible disclosure of material product data provided by 
the corporation in simple, easy-to-understand language. As compared to the 
current contractarian view towards accountability for product information 
disclosures, a corporate law view of accountability proves superior. 
 
